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Summary 
Bacterial communities face multiple environmental constraints in their 
environments. One of the most prevalent ways that bacteria overcome 
these constraints is the production of public goods. By definition, public 
goods are compounds that generate benefit for the entire population, 
producer and other individuals alike. Non-producers of public goods can 
avoid the cost of production of the public goods but can still benefit from 
them. When mixed with producers, the energy that non-producers save 
from not producing the public goods allows them to grow at higher rates 
than the producers. This can cause the non-producer of the public goods to 
behave as cheaters, increase in frequency in the overall population and 
eventually diminish the cooperation and thus the production of the public 
goods. The lack of public goods production can lead to the drastic reduction 
of the carrying capacity of the overall population. This phenomenon is 
defined as the tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology.  
Bacteria are a great model to investigate the cooperator/cheater 
dynamics. Previous studies have focused on single trait-single constraint 
scenarios, demonstrating that bacterial mutants can act as cheaters and 
showed various mechanisms to avoid cheating and maintaining 
cooperation. This thesis concentrates on the characterization of the 
cheating phenomenon by quantifying the magnitude of the relative fitness 
of the cheaters under various biotic and abiotic conditions. Towards this 
goal, a comparative approach was used to determine the similarities and 
differences between two different and independent social traits, production 
of iron-siderophore pyoverdine and quorum- sensing regulated elastase. 
As important as understanding the dynamics of “single trait-single 
constraint” settings is, they are unlikely to occur in nature. In “multiple traits-
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multiple constraint” settings, a cheater for one trait can potentially be a 
cooperator for another. In that scenario, the interactions among players 
might affect their social roles, leading to complex dynamics different from 
those generated in single trait-single constraint settings. In order to explore 
this possibility, this work presents a novel tri-partite co-culture system 
involving three social actors under two different environmental constraints. 
The actors are wild-type Pseudomonas aeruginosa (full cooperator) and 
two social mutants (cheaters/partial cooperators): lasR (quorum sensing 
mutant unable to produce and secrete the public good called elastase) and 
pvdS (unable to produce and secrete the iron-siderophore pyoverdine). 
These two mutants are typically used individually in countless 
sociomicrobiology studies and, additionally, are recurrently isolated in P. 
aeruginosa chronic infections associated with cystic fibrosis. The 
environmental constraints are the presence of casein as the sole carbon 
source (whose digestion requires elastase) and iron limitation (which 
requires pyoverdine production). This two traits-two constraints system 
allowed describing the existence of strong context dependent ecological 
interactions between these mutants in orthogonal social traits, which can 
induce or prevent a drastic collapse of the population. The findings 
presented here (Chapter II) demonstrate that by having more than one 
environmental constraint and more than one social mutant, cheating of one 
of the social mutants can be averted simply by the interaction with the other 
mutant. This thesis also provides experimental evidence for how quorum 
sensing mechanism can prevent the extinction of cooperation. 
To investigate if these observations apply beyond the specific social 
players and constraints studied here experimentally; this thesis presents a 
mathematical model and determines the universal factors governing these 
social interactions (Chapter III). By using a simple model, end result of the 
competition (increase of cheater frequency and an eventual fixation), onset 
Summary 
xi 
 
and intensity of the tragedy of the commons (defined as the drop in the 
mean fitness of the population) due to cheater invasion can be predicted in 
a one trait-one constraint system. Furthermore, we describe a model to 
simulate quorum sensing regulation of a public good trait, and show how 
this mechanism can prevent fixation of the cheater mutants and thus full 
extinction of cooperation. Finally, the mathematical models in this chapter 
demonstrate that social dynamics of various strains in the long term 
composition of population in ‘multiple traits-multiple constraints’ systems 
are determined by the differences between the costs of the social traits 
involved, whereas their benefits only affect the mean fitness of the 
population. The model also predicts the scenarios for which coexistence of 
multiple social mutants is possible. 
Overall, the work presented in this thesis provides experimental data 
and theoretical basis that support a dynamic view of cooperation and 
cheating that is affected by the cost spent for the cooperative behavior and 
the mechanisms that control the cost and benefits of the public goods. Also, 
this work shows that the bacterial cooperation/cheating dynamics are 
dependent on the genotypes and constraints present in the environment, 
oscillating from pure competition to a possible division of labor. Moreover, 
this study reveals the difference between the costs of the traits as the main 
factor determining social dynamics in complex populations under multiple 
constraints. This work provides a theoretical framework for the 
development of new approaches to treat infections involving social mutants, 
such as cystic fibrosis, by manipulating social interactions among 
pathogens.  
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Sumário 
As comunidades bacterianas enfrentam múltiplas limitações 
ambientais nos seus habitats. Uma das estratégias mais comuns que as 
bactérias usam para ultrapassar estas limitações é a produção de bens 
comuns. Bens comuns são produtos externos que são secretados para 
fora das células, ficando acessíveis tanto a produtores como a não 
produtores. As bactérias que não produzem bens comuns conseguem 
evitar o seu custo de produção e ainda assim beneficiar deles. A energia 
economizada por não produzirem os bens comuns permite-lhes que 
tenham taxas de crescimento mais altas que os produtores. Isto leva a que 
os não produtores de bens comuns se comportem como “cheaters”, 
aumentando a sua frequência na população e, eventualmente, diminuindo 
a cooperação e consequente produção de bens comuns. A falta de 
produção de bens comuns pode levar à redução drástica da capacidade de 
suporte de toda a população. Este fenómeno é definido em biologia 
evolutiva como “Tragédia dos Comuns”. 
As bactérias são um bom modelo de estudo de dinâmicas 
cooperador/”cheater”. Estudos anteriores focaram-se num cenário de 
limitação de um único recurso, demonstrando que bactérias mutantes 
podem agir como “cheaters” e mostrando vários mecanismos para evitar o 
“cheating” e manter a cooperação. Esta tese centra-se na caracterização 
do fenómeno de “cheating” focando-se na quantificação da sua magnitude 
quando sob diferentes condições bióticas e abióticas. Para isso foi usada 
uma abordagem comparativa focada nas semelhanças e diferenças entre 
dois recursos sociais independentes, produção de ferro-sideróferos de 
pioverdina e regulação de elastase por quórum sensing. 
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Apesar de ser importante compreender a dinâmica na limitação de 
um único recurso, este cenário é pouco provável de ocorrer na natureza. 
Num cenário de limitação de múltiplos recursos, um “cheater” para um 
recurso pode potencialmente ser um cooperador para outro recurso. As 
interações neste cenário podem afectar as funções sociais dos 
intervenientes, desencadeando dinâmicas complexas diferentes das 
geradas num cenário de limitação de um único recurso.  
Para explorar esta possibilidade, este trabalho apresenta um sistema 
de co-cultura tripartido envolvendo três intervenientes sociais em dois 
ambientes com limitações. Os intervenientes são Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa tipo selvagem (cooperador completo) e dois mutantes sociais 
(“cheaters”/cooperadores parciais): lasR (mutante de quórum sensing 
incapaz de produzir elastase) e pvdS (incapaz de produzir o siderófero de 
pioverdina). Estes dois mutantes são tipicamente usados individualmente 
em inúmeros estudos de sociomicrobiologia e, além disso, são 
recorrentemente isolados em infecções crónicas de P. aeruginosa 
associadas a fibrose cística. As limitações ambientais são a presença de 
caseína como única fonte de carbono (que requere elastase para a sua 
digestão) e a limitação de ferro (que requere a produção de pioverdina). 
Este sistema de limitação destes dois recursos permite descrever a 
existência de uma forte dependência de interações ecológicas entre estes 
mutantes com recursos sociais ortogonais, induzindo ou prevenindo um 
drástico colapso da população. As descobertas aqui descritas demonstram 
que a competição entre “cheaters” com recursos ortogonais pode prevenir 
o colapso da população que seria causado por um dos intervenientes 
(Capítulo II). Esta tese também providencia evidências experimentais 
demonstrando como o mecanismo de quórum sensing pode prevenir a 
extinção de cooperação. 
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Para investigar se estas observações se aplicam para além dos 
intervenientes sociais e limitações testadas experimentalmente, esta tese 
apresenta um modelo matemático e estabelece factores universais que 
determinam estas interações sociais (Capítulo III). Usando um modelo 
simples, o resultado da competição (aumento da frequência do “cheater” e 
eventual fixação), início e intensidade da “tragédia dos comuns” (definida 
como a queda na média de “fitness” da população) devido à invasão do 
“cheater” pode ser prognosticado num sistema de uma limitação, Além 
disso descrevemos um modelo que simula a regulação por quórum 
sensing de um bem comum, mostrando como este mecanismo pode evitar 
a fixação de mutantes “cheater” e, consequentemente, a total extinção da 
cooperação. O nosso modelo mostra que a dinâmica social em sistemas 
limitantes em múltiplos recursos é determinada pelas diferenças entre os 
custos do recurso social implicado, enquanto os seus benefícios apenas 
afectam a média de “fitness”. Finalmente, os modelos matemáticos aqui 
apresentados demonstram que a dinâmica social de várias estirpes na 
composição populacional ao longo do tempo em cenários de limitações de 
múltiplos recursos é determinada pela diferença entre os custos dos 
factores envolvidos, enquanto que os seus benefícios apenas afectam a 
“fitness” média da população. Os modelos também prevêem cenários cuja 
coexistência de vários mutantes sociais é possível. 
Em resumo, o trabalho apresentado nesta tese fornece evidências 
experimentais e base teorética que suportam uma teoria dinâmica de 
cooperação e “cheating”, afectada pelo custo do comportamento 
cooperativo, e os mecanismos que controlam o custo e benefício dos bens 
comuns. Para além disso, este trabalho mostra que as dinâmicas de 
cooperação e “cheating” das bactérias são dependentes do genótipo e das 
limitações presentes no ambiente, oscilando entre a competição pura e 
uma possível divisão do trabalho. Este estudo revela também que a 
xvi 
 
diferença dos custos de recursos é o principal factor determinante da 
dinâmica social em populações complexas sob múltiplas limitações. Este 
trabalho fornece também um enquadramento teórico do desenvolvimento 
de novas abordagens para tratar infecções que envolvem mutantes 
sociais, como a fibrose cística, através da manipulação das interacções 
sociais entre os patógenos. 
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Thesis Outline 
The work presented here investigates the cooperation and cheating 
dynamics in Pseudomonas aeruginosa strain PA01, particularly upon two 
social traits that this bacterium possesses: production of iron-siderophore 
pyoverdine and quorum sensing regulated elastase. This thesis focuses 
specifically on the quantification of the magnitude of cheating and its 
relation to the onset of the tragedy of the commons, the regulatory and 
ecological mechanisms that affect the cooperator/cheater dynamics and the 
parameters that affect the competition among various social genotypes. 
Chapter I contains a general introduction to sociomicrobiology, 
ranging from its general perspectives to more specific and recent findings in 
the field, lists the various ways that bacteria cooperate and cheat, and the 
mechanisms that are shown to prevent cheating in cooperative behaviors in 
microorganisms.  
Chapter II focuses characterizing single cooperative traits in isolation, 
demonstrating the cheating behavior for each trait, identifying factors 
affecting the cheating magnitude. This chapter also identifies the effects of 
the competition among the cheaters of orthogonal social traits on one 
another and shows how these socio-ecological interactions or “cheating on 
cheaters” can help avoiding a drastic population collapse.  
Chapter III investigates the main parameters that govern the 
cooperator/cheater dynamics in public goods competitions by using simple 
mathematical models and testing various single- or multiple-cheater 
competition scenarios including quorum sensing regulation that is 
experimentally shown to maintain cooperation. 
Chapter IV summarizes the data shown in the previous chapters and 
speculates the findings achieved by analyzing them. This chapter also 
xviii 
 
focuses on the directions that the future studies can take, and possible 
transitional work that can be done to achieve new therapeutic approaches 
to treat bacterial infections by exploiting bacterial cooperator/cheater 
dynamics. 
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Preliminary notes 
Part of this chapter is included in the publication titled as 
“Maintenance of cooperation for single and multiple social traits” which is a 
review paper that is under revision for Journal of Bacteriology. 
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Introduction to Sociomicrobiology 
Social Evolution Theory 
Living beings reproduce and thus, multiply (Cleland and Chyba, 2002; 
Luisi, 1998; Oparin, 1961). By multiplication, the interactions among them 
become inevitable (Foster, 2009, 2010; Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West et 
al., 2006). During asexual reproduction, after each cell division, the 
daughter cells (at the least, initially) will be in physical proximity, and each 
division increases the chance of interactions among individual cells due to 
multiplicity. In sexual reproduction, the interaction between individuals is 
not only an outcome but also a priori requirement during this process of 
reproduction (Walker and Williams, 1976). Therefore, one can argue that to 
understand any biological process, interactions among individuals should 
always be taken into consideration, as no living being comes into existence 
and dies, in absolute isolation. One can even argue that life in total isolation 
is not possible, thus being social to a certain degree is inevitable. In this 
context, we can define sociality as the degree of interactions between 
individuals (Fisher et al., 2013; Garcia and De Monte, 2013; Walker and 
Williams, 1976; Wilson, 1975). Physical conditions of the environment 
where organisms live can dictate the level of sociality. For example, the 
physical proximity between individuals is one of the key factors that can 
change the degree of the interactions between the individuals thus, their 
sociality (Abbot et al., 2011; Foster and Xavier, 2007; Wilson, 1975). 
Physical factors in the environment such as diffusion can drift the 
individuals apart and limit the degree of interactions between those 
individuals (Dobay et al., 2014; Kümmerli et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2013).  
When studying the interactions between two individuals uni-
directionally, we can define the individual who is committing the act as the 
‘actor’ and the individual who is receiving the effect of the act as the 
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‘recipient’ (West et al., 2007b). Thus we can define this kind of interaction 
between individuals as a social behavior which applies fitness 
consequences on both the actor and the recipient (Sachs et al., 2004; West 
et al., 2007b). These consequences can vary depending on the fitness 
effects they pose on the individuals (Figure 1). When the fitness effect of 
the interaction is positive on both the actor and the recipient, this social 
behavior can be classified as mutual benefit (Waite and Shou, 2012; West 
et al., 2007a). When the social behavior poses a positive effect on the actor 
and a negative effect on the recipient, it can be sorted as selfishness 
(Krupp, 2013; West et al., 2007b). If the consequence of the social behavior 
is negative on the fitness of the actor but positive on the fitness of the 
recipient, these kinds of social behaviors are considered to be altruistic 
(Abbot et al., 2011; Van Dyken and Wade, 2012a, 2012b; Kreft, 2004; 
Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West and Gardner, 2010; West et al., 2007a). 
Finally, if the fitness of both the actor and the recipient are affected 
negatively by the social behavior, it can be defined as spiteful behavior 
(Foster et al., 2001; Gardner et al., 2004; Inglis et al., 2009; West and 
Gardner, 2010).  
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Figure 1. Classification of social behaviors depending on the fitness 
effects of an action on the actor and the recipient 
Behaviors that have positive fitness effect on the recipient and negative or 
null effect on the actor is defined as ‘altruism’, If the behavior has positive 
fitness outcomes for both the actor and the recipient can be defined as 
‘mutualism’. Mutualism and altruism are considered to be cooperative 
behaviors. When a behavior has a negative fitness effect on the recipient 
and negative or null fitness effect on the actor it can be classified as ‘spite’. 
Behaviors that have a positive fitness effect on the actor but a negative 
fitness effect on the recipient can be defined as a ‘selfish behavior’ or 
‘selfishness’. Spite and selfishness can be grouped as competitive 
behaviors.  
6 
 
Cooperation and cheating 
 Cooperation 1.
Cooperation is a social behavior that has a positive outcome on the 
fitness of the recipient regardless of the fitness change of the actor (Crespi, 
2001; Foster and Xavier, 2007; Griffin et al., 2004; Lehmann and Keller, 
2006). Thus, both mutualistic and altruistic behaviors can be considered as 
cooperative. Any interaction which is costly to the actor, even if it is causing 
a positive effect on the recipient’s fitness is difficult to explain in the context 
of the Darwinian evolution which predicts the survival of the individual that 
produces the highest numbers of progeny, which places individuals at the 
focus of selection (Foster, 2010; Hamilton, 1964a). Therefore, one expects 
that cooperative behaviors, which have a cost on the actor, should also 
have an indirect positive benefit on the cooperator which should overcome 
the cost spent; if not, altruistic behaviors should not be selected via natural 
selection. On the contrary, they are observed in all levels of life in nature 
(Allen and Nowak, 2013; Harrison, 2013; West et al., 2006, 2007a, 2007b).  
Although Darwin also touched this problem in his book, Origin of 
Species, as the selection may be applied to the family as well as the 
individual (Darwin, 1859), William D. Hamilton laid the mathematical 
explanation of evolution and maintenance of cooperation (Hamilton, 1964a, 
1964b). He argued that if the selective pressure is on the group of 
individuals which are related, depending on the proximity of their 
relatedness, the cost of the social behavior on the actor, and the benefit of 
it on the recipient, the altruistic behavior could be favored by natural 
selection (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b). Hamilton explained that the overall 
fitness of an individual cannot be explained only by the behaviors that have 
direct fitness benefits on the individual who perform the behavior such as 
the number of progeny that the individual produces. The indirect fitness 
Chapter I 
7 
 
benefits that the actor of the altruistic behavior gets by performing this 
social behavior and providing fitness benefits to its relatives, the individuals 
to which it has a genetic similarity also have to be added to the overall 
fitness of that individual. Thus Hamilton argued that the direct and indirect 
fitness of an organism sums up to its “inclusive fitness” (Abbot et al., 2011; 
Foster et al., 2006; Gardner et al., 2009, 2014; Lehmann and Keller, 2006; 
West and Gardner, 2013) (Figure 2). He argued that natural selection 
operates on the inclusive fitness which is the sum of reproductive success 
of the individual (direct fitness) and its effects on increasing the 
reproductive success of its relatives (indirect fitness). 
 
Figure 2. Inclusive fitness theory 
The inclusive fitness of an individual is the sum of its direct fitness, the 
number of its progeny, and its indirect fitness, the fitness benefit (b) that the 
individual inflicts on the individuals that are in close genetic relation to itself 
(r) with a cost on its own direct fitness (c). 
Hamilton proposed mathematical models to justify the conditions 
when a cooperative behavior can be selected. Derived from Hamilton’s 
mathematical models and thus, called after him, ‘Hamilton’s rule’ suggests 
that when r b > c, where r is the genetic relatedness between the actor and 
the recipient of the cooperative act and b is the benefit of the recipient from 
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this act while c is the cost that actor pays to perform this act (Hamilton, 
1964a, 1964b). As the rule suggests the indirect fitness component that is 
the term (r b), the benefit that the actor provides to its relative, in terms of 
the degree of the relatedness of the recipient to the actor, has to be greater 
than the cost of this act to the direct fitness of the actor for this cooperative 
behavior to be favored by natural selection. 
In agreement with Hamilton’s rule, cooperation tends to occur 
between close relatives (Fisher et al., 2013; Gilbert et al., 2007; Krupp et 
al., 2012; West et al., 2007a). Closer relatives share more recent common 
ancestors and thus more common genes. Genes that are expressed by an 
individual that increase the reproductive success of a related individual, or 
in other words a kin, can be selected. Since the related individual is likely to 
carry the same gene, the frequency of that gene in the gene pool can 
increase. This type of selection is referred as ‘kin selection’ (Damore et al., 
2012; Gardner et al., 2009, 2011; Smith, 1964).  
However, evidence of cooperation has been seen in unicellular 
organisms in planktonic forms where the interactions and exchange of 
exoproducts are relatively difficult due to diffusion, or in other occasions 
such as biofilms where cells get together as communities, and cooperating 
for certain traits, and superorganisms that are made of individuals which 
are highly similar in genetic background live as one united community 
(0<r<1), to multicellular organisms where cells with identical genetic code 
exist and operate together as one individual (r=1). Therefore, it is clear that 
cooperation is manifested in many levels of life as a spectrum. 
  
Chapter I 
9 
 
 Cheating 2.
According to Hamilton’s rule, cooperative behavior requires a cost to 
be paid by the actor of the behavior on the direct fitness of the actor (Frank, 
1998; West et al., 2007b). This depends on the excludability of the benefit 
that is normally directed to the recipient, a close relative of the cooperative 
actor. However, the act itself can be vulnerable to exploitation. This 
exploitation can occur when individuals that are not contributing to the 
cooperative behavior can benefit from the cooperative action (Ghoul et al., 
2014a; West et al., 2007b), especially when these individuals are not 
significantly related to the cooperator but still benefit from the action. In 
such scenario (r b) value would be smaller than the c value, therefore one 
would expect that such cooperative act will not be favored by natural 
selection. These organisms, which can benefit from a cooperative behavior 
without contributing to it (or contributing relatively less than the 
cooperators), are called cheaters (Frank, 2010; Ghoul et al., 2014a; West 
et al., 2006, 2007b). Cheaters can be individuals from the same species as 
the cooperators or members of entirely different species as long as they 
can benefit from the cooperative behavior.  
In other words, cheaters are individuals, in an environment where 
cooperative behavior is selected, which can gain benefits from the 
cooperative behavior without cooperating themselves or are contributing to 
the cooperation less than the rest of the individuals (Ghoul et al., 2014a). 
When the cooperators are absent, the fitness of the cheaters should be 
lower than the situation where they are with cooperators. Not paying the 
cost but still benefiting from the cooperative behavior gives cheaters a 
relative fitness advantage over the cooperators (Figure 3). Therefore, 
(when the concentration of the public good correlates to the fitness of the 
population) cheaters have a frequency dependent fitness advantage as 
they have a fitness advantage when rare but a lower advantage if not 
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enough cooperators are present to support the cooperative behavior (Ross-
Gillespie et al., 2007; Wilder et al., 2011). Thus, as the fitness of the 
cheaters is higher when rare, it is long argued that the selective pressures 
for cheaters to increase in frequency should diminish the cooperative 
behavior (Stewart and Plotkin, 2014; Yurtsev et al., 2013). Therefore, for 
cooperative behaviors to be stable, it has been proposed that mechanisms 
to prevent cheating also exist (Bruger and Waters, 2015). To study the 
problems of how cooperation can be sustained in a population dominated 
by non-cooperators, and once established, how cooperation can be 
maintained against possible exploitations by cheaters various models were 
proposed. More recently and increasingly popularly, microorganisms are 
used as models to study these questions (Brown and Buckling, 2008; 
Foster; Parsek and Greenberg, 2005; West et al., 2007a; Xavier, 2016).  
 
Figure 3. Bacterial cooperation and cheating 
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(A) Cooperators are able to synthesize and secrete public goods 
molecules. Both cooperator and cheater cells have access to these 
molecules since they both have the receptors. This direct cheating can be 
seen in cheating for QS signaling molecules or for rhamnolipids or in biofilms 
(Rumbaugh et al., 2009; Wilder et al., 2011; Xavier et al., 2011).  
(B) Cooperators can synthesize and secrete public goods molecules which 
bind and bring other molecules to the cell. These molecules are generally 
called as scavenging molecules such as iron siderophores (e.g. pyoverdine, 
pyochelin). A mutant that avoids the cost of synthesis and secretion but still 
possesses the receptor can behave as a cheater in this example (Dumas et 
al., 2013; Kümmerli et al., 2015; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2015; Zhang and 
Rainey, 2013). 
(C) Cooperators produce molecules which can cleave/digest other 
molecules. Both cooperators and cheaters can access the digested and 
smaller molecules which are available for intake. A good example of this 
system is the digestion of casein by elastase (Eldar, 2011; Stintzi et al., 
1998; Wang et al., 2015; Wilder et al., 2011).  
(D) Cooperators produce molecules to detoxify the environment or 
breakdown the antibiotics (e.g. catalase production to decompose hydrogen 
peroxide or beta lactamase secretion to get resistance to beta lactam 
antibiotics). Cheaters do not pay the cost of the production of such 
molecules, however, benefit from the detoxified environment or the 
breakdown of antibiotics simply by being there (Morris et al., 2014; Yurtsev 
et al., 2013). 
(E) Cooperators produce toxins to kill cells of other competitor species. This 
makes the niche available for the cooperators and cheaters alike. Thus 
cheaters benefit from the toxin secretion of the cooperators, just by being 
there without paying the cost of production of such molecules (Cezairliyan et 
al., 2013; Foster, 2010; Helaine et al., 2014; Hosseinidoust et al., 2013; 
Inglis et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014). 
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Social dynamics of microorganisms 
Studying social behavior in living systems, experimentally, poses 
various difficulties generally caused by the complexity of these systems. 
Establishing which behaviors are cooperative, which individuals are the 
cooperators, which are cheaters, which genes control which behaviors, and 
which environmental context favor which cooperative behavior is rather 
complicated in many animal, plant, or fungus models.  
Studies on microbes, on the other hand, have shown that microbes 
also possess a high variety of cooperative behaviors which make them 
behave as multicellular-like communities rather than individual cells as un-
related organisms (Foster, 2010; West et al., 2006). It is now well accepted 
that microbes generally cooperate via secretion of extracellular products 
which function as public goods that are available to the whole community 
(Popat et al., 2016). These public goods can vary in structure and function 
(Figure 3). Secretion of extracellular surfactants to reach further carbon and 
nitrogen sources (Xavier and Kim, 2011), siderophores to scavenge iron 
from the environment (Brockhurst et al., 2008; Dumas and Kümmerli, 2012; 
Dumas et al., 2013; Imperi et al., 2009; Kümmerli et al., 2009; Visca et al., 
2007), extracellular proteases that digest complex carbon sources to 
ingestible smaller particles (Wang et al., 2015; Wilder et al., 2011), 
signaling molecules to regulate community level gene regulations (Popat et 
al., 2008, 2012; Rumbaugh et al., 2012a), various molecules involved in the 
formation of biofilms (Crusz et al., 2012; Mitri et al., 2011; Xavier and 
Foster, 2007; Xavier et al., 2009), toxins to kill competitors (Foster, 2010; 
Inglis et al., 2009; Mitri et al., 2013), detoxifying agents to ameliorate the 
habitat (Morris et al., 2014; Yurtsev et al., 2013) and even light production 
to establish a mutualistic relationship with a multicellular host (Clevenger 
and Fast, 2012; Foster, 2010; Milton, 2006; Sachs et al., 2004) are some of 
the social behaviors discovered and often studied in microbes (Figure 3).  
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All these cooperative behaviors are studied extensively to understand 
how these interactions have evolved and how they are maintained despite 
the potential presence of cheaters. Identification of the genes controlling 
the production of these public goods in microbes enabled the construction 
of mutants in these traits (Schuster et al., 2010; Tanouchi et al., 2012; 
Zhang and Rainey, 2007). Mutants constructed to over-produce, to under-
produce, to produce but not to benefit (receptor mutants – losers), or to 
benefit but not to produce (synthesis mutants – cheaters) have been used 
to address these questions (Table 1).  
Table 1. Roles that can be seen in social behaviors in bacteria 
Cooperators pay the cost of the social trait and reap the benefits. Cheaters 
avoid the cost of the social trait, however, can gain the benefits if there are 
public goods produced by others. Losers, although not seen in nature can be 
engineered to pay the cost of the public goods like the cooperators, 
however, cannot access its benefits. Loners are the strains that are 
independent of the social trait that the other strains are competing for (Inglis 
et al., 2016; Pacheco et al., 2015). Thus they either pay no cost or gain no 
benefit from that public good, (*) or they produce some alternative public 
good only they can benefit. 
 
 
  
Social behavior Cost benefit 
Cooperator paid gained 
Cheater not paid gained 
Loser paid not gained 
Loner not paid* not gained* 
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Tragedy of the commons in microorganisms 
A cheater mutant in a population of cooperator individuals, by 
avoiding the cost of public good production, will have a relative fitness 
advantage over the cooperators. This advantage is greater when the 
cheaters are at low frequency since there will be more cooperators to cheat 
upon. Presumably, cheaters can use the energy that they save from not 
contributing to the cooperation in the binary division and thus have a higher 
growth rate than the cooperators (Ghoul et al., 2014a). Given time, several 
cell divisions after, this difference in growth rate results in an increase in the 
frequencies of the cheater compared to the frequency of the cooperator 
(Van Dyken and Wade, 2012a). It has been frequently hypothesized that if 
cheaters reach frequency the threshold where the proportion of cooperators 
in the population is not enough to sustain the entire population, a decrease 
in the growth capacity of the community will be observed because of the 
environmental pressures which are no longer being compensated by the 
cooperative act. In principle, this decrease can lead to levels of growth yield 
similar to that of a cheater growing in a monoculture, in the absence of 
cooperators (Hardin, 1968; MacLean, 2008; Maclean and Gudelj, 2006; 
Stewart and Plotkin, 2014). This phenomenon of cheater takeover followed 
by the collapse of cooperation and the reduction of growth capacity is 
called the tragedy of the commons, a term first coined by the biologist 
Garret Hardin, then used heavily in economics and in the recent years in 
evolutionary biology (Hardin, 1968). Garret Hardin defined the tragedy of 
the commons as the scenario in which each individual maximize their own 
direct fitness in competition for a limited resource, which is accessible by all 
individuals, and as a result of this process, overall fitness of the population 
decreases due to the ultimate reduction of the resource (Hardin, 1968, 
1994). 
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The tragedy of the commons generally refers to a fitness decrease in 
the overall population due to overexploitation of a common (natural) 
resource which is extrinsic to the individuals that exploit it. These commons 
are considered to be non-excludable and the access to them is rivalrous for 
the competing individuals (Figure 4). When there is a compound produced 
by certain individuals in the population that can provide benefit to whole 
population (and there is no rivalry for this production), these intrinsic 
compounds or in other words, ‘social’ public goods, are also non-
excludable, and thus, can be exploited by the individuals that do not 
contribute to the production of these public goods or contribute relatively 
less than the others (Rankin et al., 2007) (Figure 4). This is known as the 
public goods dilemma (Dionisio and Gordo, 2006). In biological systems, 
such interactions among producers and non-producers benefiting from the 
same public goods can lead to eventual domination of the non-producers, 
and thus depletion of the social public good. With the lack of these public 
goods, the fitness of the whole population can decrease, and this decrease 
can cause the numbers of this population to shrink or completely disappear, 
similarly to the tragedy of the commons scenarios. However, while the 
fitness of the whole population decreases by the overexploitation of an 
extrinsic compound in the case of the tragedy of the commons; in the case 
of the public goods dilemma, it depends on a compound that is intrinsic to 
the competing individuals.  
It has been shown that the public goods dilemma and the tragedy of 
the commons can occur simultaneously in the biological systems (as in this 
thesis) (Dionisio and Gordo, 2006; West and Buckling, 2003). This situation 
occurs when bacteria produce public goods (e.g. elastase, pyoverdine), 
and this production benefits the whole population non-excludably and the 
action of this production is non-rivalrous (as in public goods dilemma), 
however, the consequent effect of these public goods can behave as a 
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non-excludable but rivalrous commons (e.g. digested carbon source via the 
proteolytic activity of elastase or pyoverdine bound iron molecules) (Figure 
4), and thus, lead to a tragedy of the commons (Dionisio and Gordo, 2006).  
In this thesis, we will refer to the population collapse (reduction in the 
numbers of individuals in a population) that is seen in bacterial populations 
due to exploitation of bacterial exoproducts as the tragedy of the commons 
as it was referred in studies which used similar setting to ours (Asfahl et al., 
2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015). Although similarities can 
be found between this definition of the tragedy of the commons and the 
phenomenon commonly referred as ‘Darwinian extinction’ or ‘evolutionary 
suicide’ in which adaptations lead to the extinction of the population (J. 
Rankin and López-Sepulcre, 2005; Rankin et al., 2007; Webb, 2003), we 
highlight that the tragedy of the commons, by addressing fitness decreases 
caused by the exploitation of the public goods (or the consequent effects of 
these public goods), better explains the loss of fitness observed in the 
bacterial population upon invasion of non-producers. 
The tragedy of the commons is demonstrated in vitro bacterial 
cultures under specific abiotic constraints (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et 
al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015). Although often theorized (Dionisio and Gordo, 
2006; MacLean, 2008), the tragedy of the commons, or in other words 
population collapse due to cheater spread, is hard to be observed in natural 
settings (due to difficulties in sampling). Although it is documented that 
cheaters can arise and spread in natural populations, population collapse 
due to this has not been observed (Andersen et al., 2015). This poses the 
question what are the mechanisms that can prevent this phenomenon from 
happening in nature. Cooperation and the genes controlling cooperative 
behaviors such as public goods production in bacteria are well documented 
(West et al., 2007a). The sole existence of these behaviors shows that they 
are favored and selected by natural selection (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b). It 
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also indicates that there must be mechanisms to protect cooperation from 
cheater invasions (Bruger and Waters, 2015). 
Garret Hardin argues that there are two main mechanisms that can 
prevent the tragedy of the commons from happening, privatization and 
regulation (Hardin, 1968, 1994). As discussed, human societies generally 
use both solutions to deal with the problem of managing the public goods. 
Societies which tried either only privatization (e.g. capitalism) or only the 
strict regulation of public property via policing (e.g. communism) did not 
function optimally. Most of the modern societies use both solutions to 
regulate different public goods. While some public goods can be privatized, 
such as land by putting a fence around it, some simply cannot be privatized 
such as clean air since the atmosphere is not excludable, in other words, it 
is near impossible to put a fence around it. Thus countries police each 
other to restrict their pollutions (Figure 4). 
The categorization of goods in Figure 4 can also be applied into 
microbial compounds. As humans, bacteria also compete for goods, or in 
other words compounds that increase their fitness in given environments. 
Most of the studies on bacterial social behaviors (as in this thesis) focus on 
the cooperation via secreted products or the outcomes of these 
compounds. In general, these products are not fully ‘public’ goods as the 
bacteria have to compete to have access to these goods as their 
concentrations limited to the availability of the producers. This shifts 
bacterial exoproducts more to the ‘common’ goods. Although some 
bacterial cooperative behaviors can be defined as public goods as 
described in Figure 4 such as light production in the light organ of 
Euphrymna scolopes via Vibrio fischeri (Engebrecht et al., 1983; Miyashiro 
and Ruby, 2012; Sachs et al., 2004), other bacterial cooperative behaviors 
such as pyoverdine production fits more in the common goods definition. 
Depending on the environment, being more or less viscous, pyoverdine can 
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be more public or private, respectively (Kümmerli et al., 2009). Thus, these 
observations show that depending on the molecule (or the outcome of a 
behavior such as bioluminescence) or the environment that bacteria occupy 
can place these compounds in a continuum in the chart that can be seen in 
Figure 4.  
Recent studies provide strong evidence that microorganisms also 
adopt similar strategies to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Asfahl et al., 
2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015). Some strategies directly 
involve the privatization of the public goods, and thus prevent a total 
cheater takeover (Craig Maclean and Brandon, 2008). On the other hand, 
as further discussed below, cooperation in bacteria can be policed either 
via rewarding or by punishing. 
 
Figure 4. Classification of goods that have positive fitness effects on 
individuals 
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The goods are classified by their rivalry and their excludability. Public goods 
must be non-rivalrous and fully-excludable. If a molecule is privatized 
meaning that it is excluded from the recipients or become rivalrous then it 
becomes more like a private good (Dionisio and Gordo, 2006).  
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Mechanisms to prevent cheating in microbial populations 
Studies on various public goods traits in microorganisms revealed 
multiple mechanisms to prevent cheating in those systems. Mainly five 
distinct mechanisms were proposed to explain the maintenance of 
cooperation and prevention of the tragedy of the commons in bacterial 
populations recently reviewed in Bruger and Waters, 2015: 
 Quorum Sensing 1.
Bacteria secrete small molecules called autoinducers to the 
extracellular environment (Ng and Bassler, 2009; Pereira et al., 2013; 
Rumbaugh et al., 2009). The more cells in a given space, the higher the 
concentration of these molecules would get. Bacteria have specific 
receptors for detecting these autoinducers. When cells reach a density 
threshold, which is detected by a certain critical concentration of 
autoinducers, the bacterial cells in that given niche alter the expression of 
the genes regulated by the autoinducer in a synchronized manner (Li et al., 
2014; West et al., 2012). This process is called quorum sensing since it 
enables bacteria to make ‘decisions’ depending on their ‘quorum’, or more 
precisely, according to their population density (Even-tov et al., 2016; Ng 
and Bassler, 2009) (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Quorum sensing and the regulation of public goods 
production 
Quorum sensing is a mechanism that allows bacteria regulate certain genes 
via asserting their cell densities by secreting and detecting small signalling 
molecules called autoinducers. When the concentration of these molecules 
increases, the regulation of associated genes in the bacterial genome also 
alters. This allows bacteria to produce public goods only when the cell 
densities of the producers are high enough to get the benefits of this action 
directly 
Very often the genes controlled by quorum sensing are genes 
involved in the production of public goods (Heilmann et al., 2015; Parsek 
and Greenberg, 2005; Whiteley et al., 1999). Bacteria secrete public goods 
to their extracellular medium as a response to environmental constraints 
(Bachmann et al., 2013; Van Dyken and Wade, 2012b; Foster, 2010; 
Frank, 2009). Often the concentration of the public goods is important for its 
efficacy. For example, the concentration of elastase, an enzyme required to 
digest complex protein sources such as casein into casamino acids, is an 
example of a public good where a certain concentration is required for 
efficient degradation of casein and the liberation of casamino acids to be 
used as carbon and nitrogen sources (Dandekar et al., 2012; Delden et al., 
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1998). Therefore, if the whole bacterial population secretes elastase, a high 
concertation of elastase as a pool can efficiently digest casein into 
casamino acids which will be available to all the cells in the environment 
(Heilmann et al., 2015).  
Quorum sensing also makes the cooperative behavior, which it 
regulates, more favorable by natural selection since it increases the 
relatedness among the cooperative individuals by inducing the public good 
production when the producers are in high density and in close proximity 
(Rumbaugh et al., 2012b; Schluter et al., 2016). Cooperation, regulated by 
quorum sensing, is only induced when the cooperative individuals, which 
are in close proximity to each other, reach the quorum threshold. Therefore, 
the public goods produced by the cooperative individuals would mostly 
benefit themselves. Thus, it can be said that quorum sensing regulation of 
public goods actually can increase the excludability of these molecules by 
regulating the timing of the production (Gupta and Schuster, 2013; 
Schuster and Greenberg, 2006).  
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 Privatization and metabolic constraint 2.
Private goods are entities that the individuals produce as a response 
to their environment, to increase their fitness (Dandekar et al., 2012). 
However, in contrast to public goods, they are only accessible by the 
producers. Cheating is practically not possible on private goods production 
(Figure 4). In human societies, privatization is an ancient, well-documented 
and common practice to solve disputes over commons (Hardin, 1968, 
1994). To prevent the tragedy of the commons from happening, people 
privatized commons as they simply put fences around them (Hardin, 1968). 
Thus, the regulation of that given commons would only give benefit to its 
owner. If the owners follow a detrimental policy to use their fenced land, 
they will be the only sufferer of the consequences and not the whole 
population.  
Privatization of the public goods is well documented in yeast. 
Invertase is an enzyme of the budding yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae 
that hydrolyses sucrose into glucose and fructose (Craig Maclean and 
Brandon, 2008; Gore et al., 2009; Koschwanez et al., 2013). About 99% of 
the fructose and glucose monosaccharides then diffuse to the environment 
and can be shared by the whole population (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; 
Gore et al., 2009). Thus they generally behave as public goods. However, 
non-producers of this trait can be prevented from cheating properly on the 
producers since the invertase producers are able to have priority to access 
to these monosaccharides. About 1% of privatization of the 
monosaccharides is enough to avoid a cheater takeover and a possible 
tragedy of the commons and sustain a population which can contain both 
cooperators and cheaters (Naumov et al., 1996). 
In bacterial populations, it was recently proposed that metabolic 
constraint is one of the mechanisms to avoid cheating and the tragedy of 
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the commons by coupling the regulation of product goods production with 
private goods (Dandekar et al., 2012) (Figure 6). In Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, LasIR quorum sensing circuit sits atop of several quorum 
sensing circuits which operate as serial systems. LasR, the master 
regulator of quorum sensing systems in this bacterium regulates the 
production of various public goods while regulating several private goods 
as well. One of the public goods that lasR regulates is LasB elastase 
(Dandekar et al., 2012). Elastase is secreted outside of the cell to cleave 
large casein molecules into smaller bits to make cells able to ingest them 
as carbon and nitrogen sources. When casein is the sole carbon source, 
lasR mutants behave as cheaters. However, lasR also controls the 
production of the enzyme to digest adenosine. Differently than elastase, the 
enzyme that digests adenosine is kept intracellularly thus; it is considered a 
private good (Dandekar et al., 2012). When casein and adenosine are the 
carbon sources in the environment, a lasR intact cell can digest both goods 
while in a monoculture of lasR mutants can digest neither. In mixture, lasR 
mutants can use the elastase and intake the digested casein molecules 
however these cannot digest adenosine, while strains with a functional 
LasR can digest both. The extra carbon source that the LsrR+ strain can 
access provides them with an extra benefit in competition with lasR, thus 
protecting the population of LasR+ cooperators from being invaded by lasR 
cheater mutants. Thus, coupling public and private goods can prevent the 
tragedy of the commons from happening in this scenario (Dandekar et al., 
2012; Sanchez and Gore, 2013). 
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Figure 6. Metabolic constraint  
When the same gene regulates a public good and an interlinked private 
good, the mutant of that gene loses the competition against the strain that 
has that gene functional in an environment where both public and private 
goods are needed to sustain metabolic functions.  
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 Metabolic prudence 3.
One of the mechanisms that has been proposed to prevent cheating 
in bacteria is called metabolic prudence (Xavier et al., 2011). To invade 
new niches, Pseudomonas aeruginosa is capable of producing 
rhamnolipids, a carbon-rich surface polymer, which enables bacteria to 
swarm into unpopulated areas. Xavier and colleagues showed that this 
bacterium only invests in rhamnolipid production in metabolically un-
balanced conditions when carbon concentrations are higher in relation to 
nitrogen concentrations (Xavier et al., 2011). Bacteria require both carbon 
and nitrogen to divide and reproduce whereas the production of 
rhamnolipids requires carbon but not nitrogen. Thus, by investing in 
rhamnolipid production only when the C/N ratio does not favor cell division 
the cells minimize the cost of this public good. Additionally, under these 
conditions, there is no chance for nonproducers to reproduce with a higher 
growth rate than the producers. Therefore, when bacteria suffer from lack 
of nitrogen, they can induce rhamnolipid production and swarm away 
towards unpopulated areas which might have nitrogen and carbon at the 
same time. Once that happens, bacteria can start reproducing again. The 
way that Pseudomonas aeruginosa cooperates on this behavior indicates a 
facultative cooperative behavior (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Metabolic prudence 
Regulation of the production of public goods when there are molecules 
available for public good production but not for binary division 
Although it is has been proposed that metabolic prudence can be 
ubiquitous in nature, the examples are limited to the one explained above. 
It is a mechanism that needs to be studied in various cooperative systems.  
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 Policing 4.
Policing is a ubiquitous mechanism among many eukaryotic 
organisms (Foster and Ratnieks, 2000, 2001b; Foster et al., 2002; 
Kümmerli, 2011; Lehmann and Keller, 2006; Rankin et al., 2007). It can be 
defined as an aggressive act that targets the cheating individuals to remove 
their fitness advantage that comes from their abuse of the cooperative 
behavior. It can operate either as harming the non-cooperative individual 
(punishing the cheaters) (Figure 8) or limiting their benefit from the 
cooperative behavior thus increasing the relative benefit that the 
cooperators gain from the cooperative behavior (rewarding the cooperator) 
(Figure 9). Policing is a well-documented mechanism among mammals 
such as in social primates, birds in their investment of the care of their 
offspring and the social insects for their collective scavenging behavior 
(Foster and Ratnieks, 2001a, 2000; Kümmerli, 2011; Manhes and Velicer, 
2011).  
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Figure 8. Policing via direct harm 
When toxin secretion-toxin resistance system is coupled with a public good 
production, cheaters for the public good are directly harmed (and killed) by 
the toxins. 
One common example of policing as a punishing/rewarding behavior 
is observed in bacteria belonging to Rhizobia genera which occupy the 
roots of plants and forms a mutual relationship (Sachs et al., 2004; Waite 
and Shou, 2012). Plants supply oxygen and various nutrients to the 
bacteria while bacteria fixe nitrogen that the plant cannot obtain by itself. 
Additionally, plants can sense the amount of the nitrogen from the bacteria 
and alter the levels of oxygen and nutrients in return. A similar policing 
behavior is observed between the bacterium Vibrio fischeri and their squid 
host (Milton, 2006; Sachs et al., 2004). While bacteria produce the 
bioluminescence that the squid uses for camouflage, the squid supplies the 
bacteria with nutrients. 
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Figure 9. Policing via reciprocity 
(A) When both cooperative partners (purple and blue cells) supply each other 
with the public goods they need, cooperation can be sustained. 
(B) If one partner (red cell) does not supply the exchanged public good, the 
cooperator (purple cell) can avoid the public good production that it makes to 
reciprocate.  
In Pseudomonas aeruginosa, cyanide production and resistance 
against it are coupled traits (Wang et al., 2015). And these traits are both 
regulated under the RhlIR system. RhlIR system is regulated by LasIR 
system. LasR, the master regulator of quorum sensing in P. aeruginosa, 
also controls several public goods genes, including LasB elastase 
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production. When grown in casein medium, lasR mutants arise. However, 
by mutating in lasR gene, they cannot produce nor have resistance against 
cyanide. Thus the cooperators, lasR intact population, can have immunity 
over their own cyanide production, and also benefit from the casein 
digestion via elastase. By coupling cyanide immunity with a public good 
production polices the cooperation against cheater invasions (Wang et al., 
2015).  
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 Spatial structure and limited dispersal 5.
Spatial structures such as biofilms can let related cells to stay in close 
proximity and thus increase relatedness in a given area. Increased 
relatedness, according to Hamilton’s rule, favors cooperation. Also, 
increased viscosity can limit the diffusion and dispersal of the related cells, 
and the public goods produced by them, thus increasing their benefit and in 
a way making the public good production more protected against possible 
cheaters (Krakauer and Pagel, 1995; Kreft, 2004; Kümmerli et al., 2014; 
Lion and Baalen, 2008; Nadell et al., 2010; Xavier et al., 2009).  
The ways that bacteria can create and sustain its spatial structure can 
vary depending on the species. It is shown that antagonistic relations 
between different bacterial species can result in segregation. Segregation 
of different genotypes allows each genotype to interact with itself (Bucci et 
al., 2011). Therefore segregation via antagonistic relation can create niches 
with higher relatedness which favors cooperative behaviors. This can be 
summarized as competition paving the way of cooperation.  
Biofilms are one of the most common ways that bacteria build a 
spatial structure (Figure 10). Extracellular lipids, polysaccharides, and 
nucleic acid molecules make up the biofilm matrix where cells can anchor 
and switch from a motile, planktonic phase to a sedentary phase (Xavier 
and Foster, 2007; Zhang et al., 2009). The biofilm matrix does not only 
influence diffusion of these static cells but also diffusion of the exoproducts 
secrete to the environment. Thus the molecules that are secreted generally 
stay around the cells that secrete them. Also, when a cell divides the sister 
cells tend to stay adherent rather than drifting apart (Dobay et al., 2014; 
Kümmerli et al., 2009; West et al., 2012). This way an exoproduct that is 
produced by one cell is more likely used by its closest relatives which are 
also more likely to be the producers of these exoproducts. Therefore, 
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biofilms by providing a spatial structure can increase interactions among 
relatives and this favor maintenance of cooperation among bacteria. 
However, this positive effect of close relatives sticking together can be 
diminished with the negative effect of the increased competition among 
these close relatives (Taylor, 1992; West et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 10. Biofilm formation and growth in a spatial structure  
When the cooperators (purple cells) produce a biofilm and grow next to their 
closest kin, the polymers (black lines and curves) they secrete and bind 
them together and allow them to grow in close proximity also reduces the 
diffusion of not only the cells but also the other public good molecules 
(yellow pies). This way, the benefit of the public good production is mainly 
gained by its producers and not by the non-producer cells (red cells). 
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If a mutation appears in a gene that is responsible for the synthesis of 
an exoproduct of a cell in the biofilm, that cell can have an advantage when 
it is surrounded by the cooperator cells. However, the more they grow the 
less they can benefit from the exoproducts that are produced by the others 
since the cheater cells that are in the center of a cheater patch will receive 
less and less benefit from the exoproducts (Kreft, 2004; Li and Tian, 2012; 
Popat et al., 2012). Thus the spatial structure gives more benefit from the 
exoproduct to the producers than the cheaters. This asymmetry can reduce 
the fitness advantage of the cheaters that is gained by avoiding the cost to 
synthesize and secrete this exoproduct to a level that not producing the 
public good becomes non-advantageous and perhaps deleterious. 
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Pseudomonas aeruginosa as a model organism to study 
cooperation and cheating in bacterial populations 
As microbes, and more specifically bacteria, have been proven to be 
useful model systems to study cooperation and cheating, many cooperative 
behaviors in bacteria have been documented (Damore et al., 2012; West et 
al., 2006, 2007a). Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a gram-negative bacterium 
that possesses many of the documented bacterial cooperative traits. P. 
aeruginosa can be found in various habitats such as soil and water as well 
as causing deadly infections in immunocompromised patients. This 
bacterium species has been shown to be a valuable model organism to 
study bacterial social evolution, cooperation/cheating dynamics, and the 
relation between bacterial cooperation and infections (Lutter et al., 2008; 
Stover et al., 2000; Tümmler et al., 2014).  
P. aeruginosa can live on various surfaces and environments that 
overlap with human habitats. Culturing and maintaining P. aeruginosa 
populations in laboratory environments are easy and sustainable. P. 
aeruginosa is a fast growing strain which makes it a favorable species for 
the evolutionary adaptation experiments (Asfahl et al., 2015; Kümmerli et 
al., 2015; Marvig et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). Its genome is fully 
sequenced and this makes it possible to link certain social behaviors to 
certain genes and their regulation machineries (Balasubramanian and 
Mathee, 2009; Feinbaum et al., 2012; Stover et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 
2003; Whiteley et al., 1999). Also, diagnosing the gene-behavior link leads 
the way to engineer mutant strains in this species, to conduct fully factorial 
studies.  
P. aeruginosa possesses many of the documented bacterial social 
behaviors (Balasubramanian and Mathee, 2009; Feinbaum et al., 2012; 
Tümmler et al., 2014). It can secrete several iron-siderophore molecules 
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such as pyoverdine and pyochelin which help bacteria scavenge iron when 
soluble iron concentrations are low in the environment (Imperi et al., 2009; 
Moon et al., 2008; Takase et al., 2000). P. aeruginosa has a very complex 
quorum sensing system which regulates many of its cooperative traits, one 
of which is the secretion of elastase which helps bacteria to cleave complex 
carbon structures into smaller pieces for the cellular intake (Jimenez et al., 
2012; Wagner et al., 2003). P. aeruginosa is known for its ability to form 
robust biofilms which provide protection to the bacteria from antibiotics in 
the environment. It is shown that P. aeruginosa can secrete rhamnolipids to 
swim or swarm on the surfaces (Xavier et al., 2011). These secretions are 
also proven to be cooperative and prone to be cheated. P. aeruginosa can 
also secrete bacteriocins which allow the mechanisms of reciprocity and 
policing to be studied in this bacterial system (Inglis et al., 2009).  
P. aeruginosa is also an opportunistic human pathogen that is the 
major cause of the nosocomial infections (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014; 
Hogardt and Heesemann, 2010; Lakshmana Gowda et al., 2013; Lutter et 
al., 2008; Takase et al., 2000; Wilder et al., 2009). It can lead to a high rate 
of mortality by causing infections in immunocompromised patients. It can 
commonly infect the wounds of the burn victims, and the lungs of cystic 
fibrosis patients (Haas et al., 1991; Mulcahy et al., 2014). P. aeruginosa 
being the most common bacterial species during the chronic phase of the 
cystic fibrosis infections became the focus of attention in microbiology 
(Hogardt and Heesemann, 2010; Marvig et al., 2013; Winstanley and 
Fothergill, 2009).  
Commonly, in the adolescent ages of a CF patient, an environmental 
P. aeruginosa strain colonizes is the lungs of the CF patient. It was shown 
that the cooperative traits that P. aeruginosa possesses are vital for the 
colonization (Andersen et al., 2015; Rau et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2006a) 
(Figure 11). P. aeruginosa uses siderophores, proteases, surfactants, 
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bacteriocins to carve itself a niche in the host tissue by competing with 
other invasive strains and also the host immune system elements. In this 
acute phase, the symptoms that are caused by the bacterial virulence 
factors are severe. If the patient survives with the help of antibiotic 
treatments, the infection proceeds to a chronic phase. Interestingly, P. 
aeruginosa samples that are isolated during this phase show a low 
virulence profile (Andersen et al., 2015; Jiricny et al., 2014). Various 
mutants of the cooperative traits are also prevalent in the isolate 
populations (Ciofu et al., 2010; Friman et al., 2013a; Lutter et al., 2008; 
Sommer et al., 2015). Mutations in quorum sensing and iron-scavenging 
mechanisms are especially common in this phase (Jiricny et al., 2014; 
Smith et al., 2006a; Wilder et al., 2009). These two systems, quorum 
sensing and iron-scavenging, are considered to be social traits (Jiricny et 
al., 2010; Kümmerli and Ross-Gillespie, 2013; Rumbaugh et al., 2009; 
Wang et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2014). Quorum sensing controls various 
cooperative behaviors in P. aeruginosa and the mutation in its master 
regulator, lasR, is prevalent in most patients (Smith et al., 2006a). Similarly, 
pvdS mutants, mutants in the sigma factor of production of pyoverdine, the 
primary iron-siderophore of P. aeruginosa that are unable to induce 
pyoverdine production are also frequently isolated during this phase 
(Andersen et al., 2015; Kümmerli, 2015; Smith et al., 2006a). The mutants 
isolated from this phase have the characteristics of cheating behavior in 
vitro. Also, other studies showed that synthesis mutants of pyoverdine 
production, pvdS, of P. aeruginosa appear first. Then, the receptor mutants 
appear only after the pyoverdine molecule diminishes. Thus this order of 
appearance of synthesis and receptor mutations indicates that the selective 
force in CF for selecting these mutations is likely to be social (Andersen et 
al., 2015; Kümmerli, 2015). 
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Figure 11. P. aeruginosa infection progression in CF lungs 
Colonization initiated by a WT P. aeruginosa loses many of its cooperative 
traits throughout its adaptation in CF lungs. lasR and pvdS mutants are two 
of the mutants that are frequently isolated from the samples taken during the 
chronic phase of the infections. 
Due to this link of infection progression and the bacterial social 
dynamics in this species, P. aeruginosa became one of the most well 
studied bacteria in sociomicrobiology. Currently, there are treatment 
approaches such as using engineered, cheating and antibiotic sensitive 
strains named ‘Trojan strains’ are being discussed (Brown et al., 2009). 
The expectation is that by using the competitive advantage of a cheating 
strain and after its fixation using the antibiotic therapy could one day be a 
viable treatment option. However, understanding the complex dynamics of 
the different mutants and strains during this bacterial infection is extremely 
important to develop safer and more effective treatments. 
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 Cooperation, Cheating, and Chapter II:
the Tragedy of the Commons
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Preliminary notes 
The author of the thesis participated in the planning and analysis of 
all the experiments presented in this chapter. The author executed all the 
experiments shown in this chapter. Part of this chapter is included in the 
publication titled as “Cheating on orthogonal social traits prevents the 
tragedy of the commons in Pseudomonas aeruginosa”. (Manuscript 
submitted to bioRxiv: http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2017/03/19/118240). 
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Abstract 
Bacterial cooperation can be disrupted by non-producers, which can 
access public goods without paying their production cost. These cheaters 
can increase in frequency, exhausting the public goods and causing a 
population collapse. We investigated how interactions among cheaters in 
orthogonal social traits influence such collapse. We characterized the 
dynamics of Pseudomonas aeruginosa polymorphic populations under 
conditions where two social traits, production of iron-scavenging pyoverdine 
and quorum sensing regulated elastase, are necessary. We demonstrate 
that cheaters for either trait compete with both the wild type and each other 
and, since production of pyoverdine is costlier than elastase production, 
pyoverdine cheaters impair invasion by quorum sensing mutants, 
preventing the collapse caused by the latter.  
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Introduction 
Although bacteria are unicellular organisms, they can engage in many 
group behaviors including biofilm formation, swarming motility, production 
and secretion of extracellular proteases and iron-chelating siderophores 
(Bruger and Waters, 2015; Foster, 2010; Parsek and Greenberg, 2005; 
Xavier, 2016). The collective production of costly, secreted compounds 
provides fitness benefit to the entire population and can be considered as 
cooperative behaviors. Cooperation is frequently under the threat of 
exploitation by cheaters: individuals that benefit from the cooperative action 
but contribute little or nothing at all to the production of the public goods. 
When mixed with cooperators, cheaters can increase in frequency and 
cause loss of cooperation by exhaustion of the public goods, leading to a 
collapse of the entire population, characterized by a strong decrease in the 
growth yield of the entire population (Rankin et al., 2007). This 
phenomenon, defined as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, was coined in 
economics (Hardin, 1968), but has been explored in ecology (Waite and 
Shou, 2012) and has also become a focus of attention in microbiology in 
the last decade (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; MacLean, 2008; 
Wang et al., 2015; West et al., 2006).  
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain how cooperative 
behaviors are still observed and maintained in microbial populations 
despite the emergence of cheaters. For instance, spatial structure and 
diffusion (Dobay et al., 2014; Drescher et al., 2014; Foster et al., 2004; 
Krakauer and Pagel, 1995; Kreft, 2004; Kümmerli et al., 2009; Lion and 
Baalen, 2008; Nadell et al., 2010; Persat et al., 2015; West et al., 2012), 
pleiotropy (Bachmann et al., 2013; Banin et al., 2005; Dandekar et al., 
2012; Friman et al., 2013b; Harrison and Buckling, 2009; Ross-Gillespie et 
al., 2015; Sandoz et al., 2007; Wagner et al., 2003; Wilder et al., 2011), 
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restricted migration (Kerr et al., 2006), social and non-social adaptations 
(Asfahl et al., 2015; Hammarlund et al., 2016; Kümmerli et al., 2015; Waite 
and Shou, 2012), policing mechanisms (Wang et al., 2015), molecular 
properties of public goods (Kümmerli and Brown, 2010), and metabolic 
strategies (Xavier et al., 2011) play significant roles in maintaining 
cooperation and avoiding the tragedy of the commons (Bruger and Waters, 
2015). Importantly, despite all these mechanisms to inhibit cheaters’ 
invasion, cheating behavior is still observed in vitro (Asfahl et al., 2015; 
Dandekar et al., 2012; Sandoz et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2015), in vivo 
(Czechowska et al., 2014; Rumbaugh et al., 2009), and in natural 
populations (Cordero and Polz, 2014; Katzianer et al., 2015; Winstanley et 
al., 2016). 
 Certain cheaters are also clinically relevant and are repeatedly 
isolated from the sputum samples of cystic fibrosis (CF) patients chronically 
infected with Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Andersen et al., 2015; Smith et al., 
2006a; Sommer et al., 2015; Winstanley et al., 2016). CF is a genetic 
disorder which causes thickening of mucus in the lungs. Although initial 
acute infections are normally associated with colonization of the lungs by 
wild type (WT) P. aeruginosa, subsequent chronic infections consist of 
polymorphic populations which include mutants affected in social traits 
(Nguyen et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2006a; Sommer et al., 2015; Zhang and 
Rainey, 2013). Importantly, in vitro studies, which focused on one trait and 
one constraint at a time, demonstrated that invasion by a cheater leads to a 
tragedy of the commons (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; Wang 
et al., 2015). However, despite the prevalence of social cheaters in the CF 
lung population, population collapse due to the invasion of cheaters has not 
been described. Therefore, we reasoned that studying interactions among 
multiple social cheaters, simultaneously, under conditions where more than 
one social trait is required could provide new insights into social dynamics 
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of P. aeruginosa populations in CF lungs and other environments. When 
more than one environmental constraint is present, the roles among 
different social mutants are likely to be more complex, since a cheater for 
one trait could potentially be a cooperator for another, making ‘cheater’ and 
‘cooperator’ relative terms (Ghoul et al., 2014b; Zhang and Rainey, 2013). 
We hypothesize that in environments where multiple constraints require 
bacteria to express multiple cooperative traits simultaneously, competition 
among mutants in orthogonal social traits (traits that are not known to be 
functionally linked), could influence their co-existence and the magnitude of 
the collapse of the population. This possibility is further supported by recent 
theoretical and experimental studies showing that interactions between 
interlinked cooperative traits significantly affect the course of their evolution 
(Brown and Taylor, 2010; Mellbye and Schuster, 2014; Popat et al., 2017; 
Ross-Gillespie et al., 2015).  
 Here we examine the consequences of ecological interactions 
among social cheaters and the full cooperator in P. aeruginosa populations 
under conditions where two orthogonal cooperative traits are required.  
 Both lasR and pvdS mutants are used individually in a large number 
of sociomicrobiology studies (Cox and Adams, 1985; Dandekar et al., 2012; 
Griffin et al., 2004; Kümmerli and Brown, 2010; Lamont et al., 2002; 
Sandoz et al., 2007; Visca et al., 2007; De Vos et al., 2001) and are among 
the most common mutants recurrently isolated from the sputum samples of 
CF patients (Andersen et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2006a; Winstanley et al., 
2016).  
LasR is the master regulator of quorum sensing (QS) and controls the 
production of elastase (Figure 12). Production and extracellular secretion of 
elastase is essential for P. aeruginosa to digest complex sources of amino 
acids, such as casein, which serves as carbon and nitrogen source 
(Dandekar et al., 2012). Previous studies showed that lasR mutants grow 
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poorly in media containing casein as the only carbon source, but increase 
in frequency when mixed with WT bacteria. This invasion of the mutant 
eventually leads to a collapse where the total cell numbers of the 
population are drastically reduced due to the depletion of producers of the 
essential public good (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; Wang et 
al., 2015).  
 
Figure 12. Pseudomonas aeruginosa quorum sensing circuits 
There are four quorum sensing circuits identified in P. aeruginosa. They 
function in series, in which LasIR circuit sits atop. LasI synthesizes the signal 
molecule 3-oxo-C12-HSL which binds to LasR. This complex then regulates 
several genes including lasB (which codes for elastase) and the other three 
quorum sensing circuits in P. aeruginosa, RhlIR, PqsR, and IqsR. (Figure 
adapted from Lee and Zhang, 2014). 
Similarly, production of pyoverdine is one of the most studied 
cooperative traits in bacteria (Cox and Adams, 1985; Griffin et al., 2004; 
Kümmerli and Brown, 2010; Lamont et al., 2002; Visca et al., 2007; De Vos 
et al., 2001). Although iron is one of the most abundant elements in nature, 
it is generally found in its insoluble ferric form (Fe3+) in the aerobic 
environments. Since iron is vitally important in various reactions in the cell, 
the competition for iron is also severe in nature. In an infection, host would 
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use their own mechanisms to limit the access to iron for bacteria by using 
transferrin and bacteria compete with that by using siderophores. In such 
iron-limited environments, pyoverdine is secreted by the P. aeruginosa, 
chelates iron from the environment and is subsequently retrieved, providing 
iron to the cell (Visca et al., 2007) (Figure 13). Mutants in pyoverdine 
synthesis (e.g. pvdS) do not pay the cost of its production but are still able 
to retrieve the iron-bound pyoverdine produced by others, gaining a fitness 
advantage and increasing in frequency in the population (Dumas and 
Kümmerli, 2012; Dumas et al., 2013; Kümmerli and Brown, 2010).  
 
Figure 13. Pyoverdine synthesis and signalling pathway  
When in high-iron conditions (when cells have enough soluble ferrous form 
of iron, Fe
2+
 generally stored as bacterioferritin protein), dimeric Fur-Fe
2+
 
complex binds to Fur box on the promoter of pvdS, which represses σ-factor 
PvdS expression. When in low-iron condition (when bacteria lack ferrous 
Chapter II 
47 
 
iron), Fur repressor becomes inactive and pvdS is transcribed. Then σ-factor 
PvdS induces pyoverdine synthesis genes and thus pyoverdine molecule is 
produced and secreted. Pyoverdine molecules then scavenge the insoluble 
ferric form of iron, Fe
3+
 and form Ferri-pyoverdine complexes. Ferri-
pyoverdine complexes bind to FpvA receptor and thus represses the anti-σ-
factor FpvR, which would otherwise repress σ-factor PvdS. (Figure adapted 
from Lamont et al., 2002 and Leoni et al., 2000).
 
Regulation of elastase production via LasR and pyoverdine 
production via PvdS are not directly linked, and they are considered as 
orthogonal traits. However, LasR induces PQS production which has iron 
trapping ability that can decrease the available iron concentrations in the 
environment and indirectly induce the activity of PvdS (Popat et al., 2017). 
On the other hand, PvdS controls the production of protease IV which might 
serve a similar function as elastase, as both enzymes are known to digest 
elastin (Caballero et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2006b; Wilderman et al., 2001). 
We followed the cheating behavior of a lasR knock-out (KO) mutant in 
environments where casein is the sole carbon source, and thus production 
of elastase is required. In addition to this ‘one constraint - one trait’ setting, 
we added another constraint (iron depletion) and another social player (a 
pvdS KO mutant) and studied the behavior of the population in a ‘two 
constraints - two traits’ setting. We quantified the cheating behavior of a 
lasR mutant in short and long-term competitions, in iron-supplied or iron-
depleted casein media with or without the presence of a pvdS mutant. We 
found that the relative fitness of the lasR mutant is altered when the pvdS 
mutant is in the culture, but only when the lasR mutant produces 
pyoverdine. We next determined the long-term consequences of the 
interactions among the two mutants and the WT for the onset of the tragedy 
of the commons. Our results show that in the environment where the two 
cooperative traits are required, competition between the two mutants 
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affects their dynamics, preventing the drastic population collapse otherwise 
caused by the domination of the lasR mutant.   
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Results 
Effects of environmental constraints and population 
composition on cheating 
We investigated the fitness of lasR and pvdS mutants, alone and in 
competition under different environmental conditions, to determine the 
effect of the interactions between different cooperative traits on the 
dynamics of the cheater frequency and on the overall fitness of the 
population. Both mutants grow as well as WT in media where neither 
elastase nor pyoverdine is required (i.e., an iron-supplied medium where 
casamino acids (CAA) serve as simple carbon and nitrogen source) (Figure 
14A). However, when casein is the sole carbon source, lasR mutant has a 
lower growth than WT (Figure 14B) and in iron-depleted CAA medium, the 
growth yield of pvdS mutant is lower than that of WT and lasR mutant 
(Figure 14C). 
 
Figure 14. Growth yields (OD600) of WT (purple triangles), pvdS (blue 
squares) and lasR (red circles) strains of P. aeruginosa monocultures 
after 48 hours of incubation in various media 
 (A) WT, pvdS, and lasR growth yields in iron-supplied casamino acids 
(CAA) medium (Kruskal-Wallis test with Dunn’s correction, WT-pvdS ns=not 
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significant P>0.9999, WT-lasR ns=not significant P>0.9999, N=6). (B) WT, 
pvdS, and lasR growth yields in iron-supplied casein medium (Kruskal-Wallis 
test with Dunn’s correction, WT-pvdS ns=not significant P>0.9999, WT-lasR 
**=P=0.0034, N=6). (C) WT, pvdS, and lasR growth yields in iron-depleted 
CAA medium. (Kruskal-Wallis test with Dunn’s correction, WT-pvdS 
***=P=0.0002, WT-lasR ns=not significant P=0.1027, N=6). 
Importantly, even though LasR regulates most of the quorum sensing 
genes in P. aeruginosa, the growth yield of lasR mutant was only affected 
significantly in media where elastase is required (and Figure 15). These 
data corroborate that there is no direct functional link between lasR and 
pvdS under the conditions tested (Figure 14A and B) (Lee and Zhang, 
2014; Popat et al., 2017). Next, to obtain a condition where both constraints 
were present, we cultured these mutants in a medium with casein as the 
sole carbon source supplemented with transferrin to deplete iron (iron-
depleted casein medium). Monocultures of both lasR and pvdS mutants 
have a lower growth yield than WT in this medium (Figure 15) because, 
under these conditions, elastase and pyoverdine are both required for 
growth. Importantly, the growth yield of lasR mutant is smaller than that of 
pvdS mutant. 
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Figure 15. Growth yields of P. aeruginosa monocultures in iron-
depleted casein medium  
WT (purple triangles), pvdS (blue squares) and lasR (red circles) mutant 
strains grown alone (horizontal lines show means of each group, Kruskal-
Wallis test with Dunn’s correction, WT-pvdS *=P=0.011,  
WT-lasR ****=P<10
-3
, N=12.) 
We next determined the relative fitness of these two mutants in 
competition with WT. When there is no environmental constraint present, 
neither of the mutants shows any significant increase in frequency (Figure 
16 A). However, when co-cultured with WT in iron-supplied casein medium, 
lasR mutant increases in frequency, demonstrating that it can act as 
cheater under these conditions (Figure 17A-left and Figure 16B). The 
introduction of the pvdS mutant in the WT:lasR co-cultures does not affect 
the cheating behavior of lasR mutant, since lasR can also increase in 
frequency in the triple co-culture (Figure 17A-right, and Figure 18A). 
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Figure 16. Relative fitness of the mutants in co-cultures with WT 
Competitions with initial frequencies of 9:1 WT:pvdS (blue squares) or 9:1 
WT:lasR (red circles) after 48 hours of incubation in various media. (A) 
Relative fitness of pvdS and lasR in iron-supplied CAA medium (N=6). (B) 
Relative fitness of pvdS and lasR in iron-supplied casein medium (N=6). (C) 
Relative fitness of pvdS and lasR in iron-depleted CAA medium (N=6). 
Dotted lines indicate no change in relative fitness (relative fitness=1). 
 The fact that pvdS mutant does not change the behavior of lasR 
mutant in the iron-supplied casein media is consistent with the fact that 
pvdS mutant does not increase in frequency, and thus it does not act as a 
cheater under these conditions (Figure 17B and Figure 18B). Then, we 
studied the behavior of these mutants in the medium with two constraints 
(iron-depleted casein medium). In this medium, lasR mutant again 
increases in frequency in the co-cultures with WT (Figure 17C-left). 
Importantly, the relative fitness of lasR in iron-depleted casein medium is 
smaller than the observed in the iron-supplied casein medium (Figure 17A-
left). This is not due to a differential production of pyoverdine in lasR 
(Figure 19) but because, in iron-depleted casein medium, WT reaches a 
much smaller growth yield than in iron-supplied casein medium (Figure 15 
and Figure 14B). In fact, when measured in units of cumulative numbers of 
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cell divisions (CCD = final cell number – initial cell number; for more 
information see the Appendix) (Lee et al., 2011; Luria and Delbrück, 1943) 
the relative fitness per cell division of lasR is not significantly different in the 
two media (7.27x10-10 ± 2.19x10-10 versus 7.53x10-10 ± 1.20x10-10 in iron-
supplied and iron-depleted medium, respectively) and thus the relative 
fitness of the mutants in 48 hours (Figure 17) is higher in the iron-supplied 
medium, where the growth yield is also higher (Figure 15 and Figure 14B).  
 
Figure 17. Relative fitness of lasR or pvdS in iron-supplied or iron-
depleted casein media in double or triple co-cultures  
(A) Relative fitness of lasR (circles) in co-culture with WT, or with WT and 
pvdS in iron-supplied casein media (ns=not significant, P=0.1207, N=20). (B) 
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Relative fitness of pvdS (squares) in co-culture with WT, or with WT and 
lasR in iron-supplied casein media (ns, P=0.1600, N=12). (C) and (D) same 
as in (A) and (B), respectively, but in iron-depleted casein media (****=P<10
-
3
, N=15 and ns, P=0.2581, N=9, for (C) and (D), respectively). Relative 
fitness of lasR or pvdS mutants is calculated in respect to all the other 
strains in the population. Relative fitness > 1 (above the dotted lines) 
indicate conditions where the frequency of the mutant increased in relation 
to the rest of the strains in the population during the competition. Initial ratios 
of the strains in each co-culture are 9:1 for WT:lasR and WT:pvdS, and 8:1:1 
for WT:pvdS:lasR. Symbols indicate individual replicates and horizontal lines 
indicate the means of each group. 
Interestingly, when pvdS mutant added to the competition in iron-
depleted casein medium, it acts as a cheater in co-cultures with WT (Figure 
17D-left), and in triple cultures with lasR and WT (Figure 17D-right and 
Figure 18D).  
 
Chapter II 
55 
 
Figure 18. Fitnesses of lasR and pvdS relative to the rest of the 
population, or to WT, or the other mutant 
Competitions in iron-supplied or iron-depleted casein media with 
WT:pvdS:lasR triple co-culture with the initial frequencies 8:1:1 (Data from 
Figure 17). (A) Fitness of lasR, in iron-supplied casein media, relative to 
WT:pvdS (circles), WT (triangles) and pvdS (diamonds). (B) Fitness of pvdS, 
in iron-supplied casein media, relative to WT:lasR (squares), WT (filled) and 
lasR (hexagons). (C) and (D) same as in (A) and (B) (but with empty 
symbols), respectively, but in iron-depleted casein media. Symbols indicate 
individual replicates and horizontal lines indicate the means of each group. 
Dotted lines indicate no change in relative fitness (relative fitness=1). 
Strikingly, in the triple cultures under the condition where both traits 
are required, the presence of pvdS mutant results in a significant decrease 
in the ability of lasR mutant to act as a cheater (Figure 17C-right, and 
Figure 18C). These results show that the costs and benefits of the two 
social traits studied here are context dependent and support the conclusion 
that the behaviors of the social mutants vary not only with the environment, 
but also with the level of polymorphism in the population. 
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Figure 19. Total (Abs405) and relative (Abs405/OD600) pyoverdine (PVD) 
concentrations of WT, pvdS, and lasR monocultures after 48 hours of 
incubation in various media  
Total PVD concentrations (Abs405), (A) in iron-supplied CAA medium, (B) in 
iron-supplied casein medium, (C) in iron-depleted CAA medium, (D) in iron-
depleted casein medium. Relative PVD concentrations (Abs405/OD600), (E) in 
iron-supplied CAA medium, (F) in iron-supplied casein medium, (G) in iron-
depleted CAA medium, (H) in iron-depleted casein medium. (Comparisons 
are done via Mann-Whitney test; ns=not significant, P>0.05; for all 
experiments N=6; b.d.: below detection). Methodology: PVD concentration 
measurements are done after 48 hours of growth in 37
o
C shaker by 
centrifuging the cells at 14000 r.p.m. for 4 minutes (Eppendorf Centrifuge 
5418) and collecting the supernatant, measuring their absorbance at 405nm 
(Abs405) in optical cuvettes as 1:10 dilutions with PBS solutions in a Thermo 
Spectronic Helios δ spectrophotometer. 
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Cheating capacity and the onset of the tragedy of the 
commons 
We next asked what would be the long-term consequences of these 
differences in cheating capacities for the overall fitness of the population by 
performing long-term propagations (Figure 20).  
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Figure 20. Effects of abiotic and biotic factors on growth yields and 
strain composition of the population in long-term propagations  
Left Y-axes show the OD600 values prior to subculture; black symbols are the 
OD600 values of 6 biological replicates tested for each condition. Right Y-
axes show the frequencies of WT (purple), lasR (red), and pvdS (blue) 
mutants 48 hours after subculturing; data are shown as bars and represent 
the means of 6 biological replicates, error bars indicate SD. X-axes show the 
days of propagations to fresh media. (A) WT and lasR mutant co-cultures 
mixed at an initial frequency of 9:1 in iron-supplied casein media. (B) WT, 
lasR and pvdS mutants triple co-cultures mixed at initial an initial frequency 
of 8:1:1 in iron-supplied casein media. (C) and (D) same as in (A) and (B) 
but in iron-depleted casein media. 
We started co-cultures with WT:lasR or WT:lasR:pvdS (at 9:1 and 
8:1:1 initial ratios, respectively), in either iron-supplied casein medium 
(Figure 20 A and B), or in iron-depleted casein medium (Figure 20 C and 
D). The illustrations of the four experimental conditions are shown in Figure 
21.  
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Figure 21. Four scenarios representing the environmental constraints 
and population compositions tested  
(i) double co-culture in iron-supplied casein medium (WT and one mutant, 
under one environmental constraint); (ii) triple co-culture in iron-supplied 
casein medium (WT and two mutants, under one environmental constraint); 
(iii) double co-culture in iron-depleted casein medium (WT and one mutant, 
under two environmental constraints); (iv) triple co-culture in iron-depleted 
casein medium (WT and two mutants, under two environmental constraints). 
Dark-red arrows indicate a paid cost for the production of elastase and/or 
pyoverdine, and the green arrows indicate a benefit from these behaviors. 
Dark-grey backgrounds indicate optimal iron concentrations; light-grey 
backgrounds indicate depleted iron concentrations in the media. 
Propagations were performed by culture transfer to fresh media every 
48 hours. Before each passage, cell density and frequencies of WT, pvdS, 
and lasR cells were determined. Growth yields in OD600 and colony forming 
units (CFUs) are shown in Figure 20 and Figure 22, respectively.  
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Figure 22. Data from the experiments shown in Figure 20 with the 
growth yields prior to subculture, shown as CFUs/ml  
Dash lines indicate the approximate monoculture growth yields of lasR 
monoculture (3x10
8
 CFUs/ml). 
We observed that, in the long-term propagations, in five out of six 
replicates of WT:lasR co-cultures in iron-supplied casein medium, lasR 
mutant quickly increased in frequency throughout the first 8 days (4 
passages), reaching up to 90% of the population (red bars in Figure 20A). 
The total cell densities of the populations (black lines) rapidly decreased to 
levels similar to that of lasR monocultures (OD600 = 0.03) by day 12, and no 
recovery was observed in subsequent passages (Figure 20A, and Figure 
23).  
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Figure 23. Individual biological replicates from the Figure 20A  
WT:lasR populations, which are co-cultured with initial frequencies of 9:1, in 
iron-supplied casein media. ‘X’ axes show the days of propagations to fresh 
media. Left ‘Y’ axes show the growth yields (OD600), prior to subculture; data 
shown as black lines are the growth yields (OD600) of the cultures measured 
at the late stationary phase (48
 
hours after the inoculation) values. Right ‘Y’ 
axes show the frequencies of WT (purple) and lasR (red). 
We defined this density, which was reached by day 12 of the 
propagation (OD600 = 0.03), as the ‘collapse threshold’ caused by the 
domination of lasR mutant. One replicate out of six did not follow this trend; 
in this case, no population collapse was observed, and the total cell 
numbers remained high throughout the experiment (Figure 23B). The 
cause of this difference is currently under investigation, but the fact that it 
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only occurred in one of the six replicates suggests that the WT in this 
particular replicate may have acquired de novo beneficial mutation(s), that 
could prevent invasion of lasR mutant, and these are likely to be non-social 
mutation(s). 
Next, we analyzed long-term competitions in triple co-culture (WT, 
pvdS, and lasR; respectively 8:1:1) in iron-supplied casein medium (Figure 
20B, and Figure 24).  
 
Figure 24. Individual biological replicates from the Figure 20B  
WT:lasR:pvdS populations, which are co-cultured with initial frequencies of 
8:1:1, in iron-supplied casein media. ‘X’ axes show the days of propagations 
to fresh media. Left ‘Y’ axes show the growth yields (OD600) prior to 
subculture; data shown as black lines are the growth yields (OD600) of the 
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cultures measured at the late stationary phase (48
 
hours after the 
inoculation) values. Right ‘Y’ axes show the frequencies of WT (purple), 
pvdS (blue), and lasR (red). 
In this case, we observed an increase in lasR frequency, similar to 
that of WT and lasR co-cultures seen in Figure 20A, which was also 
accompanied by a drastic decrease in the overall population density. At day 
10 of the propagation, the six populations reached the collapse threshold. 
The frequencies of pvdS mutant varied between 4% and 15% throughout 
the duration of the experiment with no indication of any sustained increase 
(blue bars, Figure 20B). This result is consistent with the predictions from 
the relative fitness measurements (Figure 17B). 
Then we propagated WT:lasR co-cultures in the medium with two 
constraints (Figure 20C, and Figure 25).  
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Figure 25. Individual biological replicates from the Figure 20C  
WT:lasR populations, which are co-cultured with initial frequencies of 9:1, in 
iron-depleted casein media. ‘X’ axes show the days of propagations to fresh 
media. Left ‘Y’ axes show the growth yields (OD600) prior to subculture; data 
shown as black lines are the growth yields (OD600) of the cultures measured 
at the late stationary phase (48
 
hours after the inoculation) values. Right ‘Y’ 
axes show the frequencies of WT (purple) and lasR (red). 
In these propagations, lasR mutant also increases in frequency 
throughout the first days, but at a slower pace than in iron-supplied 
medium. The total cell numbers remain high until days 10-12, but, as the 
lasR frequencies increase to about 80%, the density of the population 
decreases, reaching the collapse threshold by day 18.  
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Hence, in all the three scenarios described here, the dominance of 
lasR mutant is followed by a drastic population collapse due to the tragedy 
of the commons (Figure 20 A – C).  
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Effects of orthogonal cheating on preventing the tragedy 
of the commons 
Our short-term competitions revealed that the cheating ability of lasR 
is influenced by both abiotic and biotic conditions, as the presence of pvdS 
in the low iron conditions reduces the relative fitness of lasR mutant (Figure 
17C). Therefore, we investigated if, under low iron conditions, pvdS could 
protect a polymorphic population from the drastic population collapse 
caused by the lasR invasion. Figure 20D (and the individual replicates in 
Figure 26) shows that in the propagation of triple co-cultures in iron-
depleted casein medium; lasR cannot increase in frequency (it stays at 
approximately 3% throughout the experiment). 
 
Figure 26. Individual biological replicates from the Figure 20D  
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WT:lasR:pvdS populations, which are co-cultured with initial frequencies of 
8:1:1, in iron-depleted casein media. ‘X’ axes show the days of propagations 
to fresh media. Left ‘Y’ axes show the growth yields (OD600) prior to 
subculture; data shown as black lines are the growth yields (OD600) of the 
cultures measured at the late stationary phase (48
 
hours after the 
inoculation) values. Right ‘Y’ axes show the frequencies of WT (purple), 
pvdS (blue), and lasR (red). 
In contrast, pvdS rapidly spreads during the first 12 days to an 
average frequency of 96% at day 18. Despite the pvdS domination, cell 
densities of the overall populations stay high. These indicate that, under 
these conditions, the presence of only 4% of pyoverdine producers in the 
population is enough to sustain the growth of the entire populations to 
levels similar to the WT mono-cultures. This interpretation is supported by 
the results shown in Figure 27, representing growth yields of mixed cultures 
with different starting frequencies of pvdS. 
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Figure 27. Effect of the initial frequencies of pvdS mutant in the co-
cultures with WT, on the overall growth yields of the population  
Each blue square represents one short term competition (48 hours) in iron-
depleted casein media. Initial frequencies of pvdS are shown in the ‘X’ axis 
(curve indicates the log regression of these short term competitions). Red 
diamonds show the OD600 measurements and matching inoculum 
frequencies of pvdS mutant from different co-cultures of the 18
th
 day of the 
experiment shown in Figure 20D (OD600 of the cultures with 3% WT and 97% 
pvdS vs. 100% WT, P=0.1316; and OD600 of the cultures with 2% WT and 
98% pvdS vs 100% WT, P<0.05). 
Overall, the domination of pvdS mutant in the triple cultures with the 
two constraints has a remarkable effect on the outcome of the propagations 
in terms of the growth yields; pvdS domination prevents expansion of lasR 
and thus the drastic population collapse of the population, which occurs 
when lasR mutant dominates (OD600=0.03, Figure 20 A – C). This occurs 
because, in this environment where both lasR mutant and WT are induced 
to produce pyoverdine, even though lasR mutant still increases in 
frequency in relation to the WT (Figure 18C), it loses against pvdS, given 
the high relative fitness of pvdS against both WT and lasR in this medium 
(Figure 17). 
In Figure 20D, although there is no pvdS fixation, Figure 27 shows 
that this could be because of pvdS not reaching high enough frequencies 
(~97%) of the entire population. We experimentally tested whether this 
would happen if the propagation were prolonged in competitions with initial 
pvdS frequencies similar to those at the 18th day of the competitions in 
Figure 20D. The results in Figure 28, below show that when the 
competitions are initiated with pvdS frequencies similar to those at day 18 
in Figure 20D, pvdS always reaches fixation when co-cultured either with 
WT(Figure 28 A, B, and C) or with WT and lasR mutant (Figure 28 D, E, 
and F).  
70 
 
 
Chapter II 
71 
 
Figure 28. pvdS reaches fixation. 
Propagations of WT:pvdS ((A), (B), and (C)) and WT:lasR:pvdS cultures 
((D), (E) and (F)) in iron-depleted casein media throughout 10 days by 
passing the cultures to fresh media with a 1/1000 dilution after each 48 
hours of growth (‘X’ axes show the days of propagation and the initial 
frequencies are shown at day 0). (A) Frequency changes of WT (purple) and 
pvdS (blue) in WT:pvdS co-cultures shown as stacked bars (right ‘Y’ axes) 
as the growth yields (CFUs/ml) of 4 biological replicates are shown as black 
lines (left ‘Y’ axes). (B) A detailed presentation of the frequency changes of 
pvdS in WT:pvdS co-cultures (blue). (C) A detailed presentation of the 
frequency changes of WT in WT:pvdS co-cultures (purple). (D) Frequency 
changes of WT (purple), pvdS (blue), and lasR (red) in WT:pvdS:lasR co-
cultures shown as stacked bars (right ‘Y’ axes) as the growth yields 
(CFUs/ml) of 3 biological replicates are shown as black lines (left ‘Y’ axes). 
(E) A detailed presentation of the frequency changes of pvdS in WT:pvdS 
co-cultures (blue). (F) A detailed presentation of the frequency changes of 
WT (purple), and lasR (red), in WT:pvdS:lasR co-cultures. Dash lines 
indicate the mean monoculture pvdS growth yields in the same media and 
the dotted lines indicate SD in (A) and (D) (mean: 1.35x10
9
 CFUs/ml; 
±SD=1.12x10
0
 CFUs/ml). Dotted lines indicate full fixation of pvdS to 100% 
of the population in (B), (C), (E) and (F). For (A), (B), and (C) N=4; and for 
(D), (E), and (F) N=3. 
As a control, we also performed the long-term propagation 
experiments in media with no constraints. As expected, we did not observe 
any significant change in the population densities (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29. Propagations of P. aeruginosa cultures in a medium with no 
constraints  
(A) WT and lasR co-culture initially mixed (9:1) in iron-supplied CAA media. 
(B) WT, pvdS and lasR co-culture initially mixed (8:1:1) in iron-supplied CAA 
media. ‘X’ axes show the days of propagations to fresh media. ‘Y’ Axes 
show the growth yields as OD600 prior to subculture, each colored line 
indicates one propagated culture (N=6), dash lines indicate the monoculture 
WT growth yields in the same medium (mean=3.57, ±SD=0.357, N=6). 
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Effects of quorum sensing regulation in preventing the 
extinction of cooperation upon emergence of cheaters 
As Figure 20 A, B, and C show, lasR does not reach fixation at the 
18th day of the competitions. To test if lasR would eventually reach fixation 
given enough time, we then propagated WT:lasR co-cultures, starting with 
similar frequencies to the co-cultures at the end of the propagations in 
Figure 20A. Figure 30A shows the results of the propagations of WT:lasR 
cocultures with initial lasR frequencies around 85%, does not change in 
frequencies throughout the propagations for 6 days. This shows that lasR 
cannot reach fixation under these circumstances. 
 
Figure 30. Frequencies of lasR in propagations of WT:lasR co-cultures 
(with initial lasR frequencies similar to the 18
th
 day of Figure 20A) in 
iron-supplied casein media in the absence or presence of exogenously 
added AHLs (3OC12-HSL)  
Initial frequency of 80-90% of lasR were used. Cultures were propagated 
throughout 6 days by passing the fresh media each 48 hours. (A) Frequency 
changes of lasR in WT:lasR co-cultures (red). (B) is the same as (A) but with 
5µM AHLs (3OC12-HSL) added to the media. Red lines indicate linear 
regressions. Dotted lines represent 100% domination of lasR. 
74 
 
Given that the lasR gene and elastase production are regulated via 
quorum sensing, we hypothesized that QS could be responsible for the lack 
of fixation of lasR mutant. We repeated the propagation experiment, shown 
in Figure 30A, with the addition of the QS autoinducer AHLs (3OC12-HSL) 
to the culture medium. The addition of AHLs abolishes the QS-dependent 
regulation of elastase by locking the LasR regulator on its ON state. With 
the addition of AHLs, the frequency of lasR mutant increases throughout 
the competitions until fixation (Figure 30B). 
We then tested whether the onset the tragedy of the commons would 
be altered if AHLs are added from the beginning of a competition with WT 
and lasR when lasR starts from relatively low frequencies. Towards this 
end, we conduct two parallel propagation experiments, one similar to 
Figure 20A, and the other is the same but with the addition of exogenously 
added AHLs. We measured the changes in the frequencies (Figure 31 A 
and B) and in growth yields (Figure 30 C and D). We find that the addition 
of AHLs do not affect the onset of the tragedy of the commons but similarly 
to the Figure 30, addition of AHLs let lasR reach fixation. Without the 
additional AHLs, similarly to Figure 30, lasR frequencies get stabilized 
around 90%. Interestingly, and similar to Figure 20A, one biological 
replicate out of six in each set of the experiment did not follow the same 
trend as the other replicates. 
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Figure 31. Frequencies and growth yields of lasR in propagations of 
WT:lasR co-cultures in iron-supplied casein media in the absence or 
presence of exogenously added AHLs (3OC12-HSL)  
Initial frequencies of 20% of lasR were used. Cultures were propagated 
throughout 12 days by passing the fresh media each 48 hours. (A) 
Frequency changes of lasR in WT:lasR co-cultures (red). (B) is the same as 
(A) but with 5µM AHLs (3OC12-HSL) added to the media. (C) Growth yields 
(CFUs/ml) prior to subculture) of the WT:lasR populations (grey lines). (D) is 
the same as (C) but with 5µM AHLs (3OC12-HSL) added to the media. 
Dotted lines in (A) and (B) represent 100% domination of lasR. Dotted lines 
in (C) and (D) indicate the monoculture growth levels of lasR. 
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We conclude that quorum sensing regulation of production of a public 
good prevents full domination of the QS cheater, maintaining cooperation in 
populations, however, does not affect the onset of the tragedy of the 
commons. On the other hand, if the cheater which wins is affected in the 
production of a public good that is not regulated via QS (e.g. pvdS) this 
mutant can dominate the entire population (Figure 28).  
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Manipulation of the environmental constraints to induce or 
prevent the tragedy of the commons 
We reasoned that if strong ecological interactions dominate in long-
term dynamics over de novo adaptive mutations, alterations of the abiotic 
factors in the triple cultures should modify the role of each mutant by 
changing the costs and benefits of the cooperative traits. Indeed, changing 
the carbon source from casein to CAA during the course of the propagation 
eliminated the behavior of lasR mutant as a cheater, and this environmental 
change was sufficient to protect the WT:lasR co-cultures from population 
collapse (Figure 32A).  
 
Figure 32. Results of manipulations of abiotic conditions in long-term 
propagations 
Aliquots of either the WT:lasR co-cultures propagated in iron-supplied casein 
media (Figure 20A) or the WT:lasR:pvdS triple co-cultures propagated in 
iron-depleted casein media (Figure 20D) for 6 days were transferred into 
either iron-supplied CAA medium or into iron-supplied casein medium, 
respectively. (A) Relief of complex carbon constraint by changing casein in 
iron-supplied casein medium to CAA, thus making it a medium with no 
constraints after the 6
th
 day of the competitions (N=6, data from the first 6 
days are from Figure 20A). (B) Relief of low iron constraint by adding iron 
instead of iron depleting transferrin and changing iron-depleted casein 
medium into iron-supplied casein medium after the 6
th
 day of the 
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competitions (N=6, data from the first 6 days are from Figure 20D). Legends 
as in Figure 20 
Conversely, the addition of iron to the iron-depleted casein medium 
(thus making it iron-supplied) reverts the expansion of pvdS mutant, 
favoring a consequent increase in lasR cheating capacity, ultimately 
causing the collapse of all the populations at day 18 (Figure 32B). We 
confirmed that changes in final frequencies observed in Figure 32B were 
not due to the high starting frequencies of pvdS; even though the selective 
advantage of pvdS is frequency dependent, this mutant is capable of 
cheating even at frequencies higher than 90% (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33. Frequency-dependent selection for pvdS and lasR 
The change in relative fitness of either mutant in relation to their initial 
frequencies in co-culture with WT in iron-depleted or iron-supplied casein 
media for pvdS (blue circles) or lasR (red squares), respectively. ‘X’ axis 
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shows the frequencies of pvdS or lasR in the beginning of the competition 
with WT. ‘Y’ axis shows the relative fitness values of pvdS or lasR over WT 
after 48h of incubation. Lines indicate linear regressions; slopes of the lines 
are shown on the figure (Comparison of the lines: F=8,525, DFn=1, DFd=52, 
**=P=0,0052; the lines are significantly different). Red and blue dots indicate 
the 95% confidence intervals of the corresponding lines. The gray dotted line 
indicates no change in relative fitness (no cheating, relative fitness=1). 
Overall, these results show that by changing the roles of lasR and 
pvdS mutants, it was possible to revert the social and ecological dynamics 
of the populations in a very predictable and reproducible manner. The 
different consequences of these abiotic manipulations are related to the 
distinct characteristics of the two mutants studied here, i. e., the tragedy of 
the commons caused by the invasion of pvdS causes a small drop in cell 
density while the invasion of lasR leads to a much greater decrease in 
density.  
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Discussion 
The classical experimental approach in sociomicrobiology has been 
to study one trait and one constraint at a time. The simplicity of such an 
approach has substantially increased our understanding of the dynamics of 
cooperative and non-cooperative clones and revealed several mechanisms 
involved in the maintenance of cooperation (Bruger and Waters, 2015; 
Parsek and Greenberg, 2005; Xavier, 2016). The ability of lasR or pvdS 
mutants to behave as cheaters is well documented under these ‘one 
constraint-one trait’ laboratory settings. However, even though lasR and 
pvdS mutants are commonly isolated from bacterial populations colonizing 
CF lungs, population collapse due to the invasion by these mutants has not 
been seen in patients (Cordero and Polz, 2014; Katzianer et al., 2015; 
Smith et al., 2006a; Winstanley et al., 2016). 
Here, we established an experimental setup where WT cooperates in 
more than one trait: production of elastase and pyoverdine. Under this 
environment with two constraints, the lasR mutant is a cheater for elastase 
but, a cooperator for pyoverdine, whereas pvdS mutant does the opposite. 
In this environment, the advantage of pvdS mutant for not producing 
pyoverdine is higher than that of lasR for not producing elastase (Figure 
17C and Figure 17D). As a consequence of the different costs associated 
with the different traits, in 3-way competitions, pvdS causes a reduction in 
the relative fitness of lasR mutant and dominates the population. This 
domination of pvdS prevents the population from a potential drastic 
collapse caused by the invasion of lasR mutants (compare Figure 20D with 
Figure 20 A – C). Although the tragedy of the commons due to the 
domination of pvdS mutant can also occur (Figure 27), the consequent 
decrease in cell density, is much less drastic than the decrease in growth 
yields observed upon the domination of lasR mutant (Figure 15 and Figure 
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20 A – C). This happens because the difference between the benefit and 
the cost of pyoverdine production is much smaller than that of elastase 
production.  
The results from the 3-way competition demonstrate that by having 
more than one environmental constraint and more than one social mutant, 
a scenario likely to be closer to the conditions in nature (such as in the 
lungs of CF patients), the cheater for the trait with the highest cost is 
expected to dominate. The consequence of that domination for the 
population collapse will depend on the benefit-cost that such trait entails. 
Importantly, the degree of the population collapse caused by the tragedy of 
the commons can eventually have very different consequences for the host. 
In case of a trait whose difference in benefit to cost is high, a drastic 
collapse on the density of the population caused by the cheater in that trait 
is expected. If a drastic collapse in density takes place, clearance of the 
pathogen is more likely to occur, resulting in a higher benefit to the host. In 
contrast, if the mutant for the trait with a low benefit to cost difference (as 
for pvdS) wins, a weak collapse occurs, to the detriment of the host. 
Our results highlight the importance of the difference between costs 
of the different traits for the population dynamics, and the difference 
between benefits and costs of each trait for the mean fitness of the 
population. By studying two different traits, we were able to compare the 
cost-benefit payoffs of each trait, which we show, that are not always linear 
or symmetrical. Whereas a high costly trait, such as pyoverdine production, 
can give a relatively smaller benefit; a trait that costs little to produce can 
give relatively larger benefits as in quorum sensing regulated elastase 
production. Given the relationship between the costs, in a fluctuating 
environment, polymorphism of various mutants of cooperative traits, as it 
occurs in CF infections, is possible. Additionally, as shown here for lasR 
mutant, quorum sensing regulation can also favor the maintenance of 
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polymorphism; as such regulation alters the values of the cost and benefits 
of the traits. 
Altogether, our results provide support for a dynamic view of 
cooperation and cheating that is dependent on the genotypes and 
constraints present in the environment. We demonstrate how changes in 
the abiotic environment can make a social mutant to stop cheating on one 
trait while still cooperating on other traits also susceptible to cheating. 
Studying such multidimensional relations in interbacterial cooperation and 
cheating dynamics could provide a better understanding for providing new 
therapeutically approaches for the treatments of infections such as those in 
the lungs of CF patients.  
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Materials and Methods 
Bacterial strains, media and culture conditions 
We used Pseudomonas aeruginosa WT strain PA01 as the full 
cooperator, PA01 lasR mutant harboring a gentamycin resistant gene 
inserted in lasR (lasR::Gm), and PA01 pvdS mutant harboring a 
gentamycin resistance gene inserted in pvdS (pvdS::Gm) (All three strains 
were provided by Kevin Foster). Iron-supplied casein medium contains 
casein (Sigma, Ref: C8654) (1% w/v) as the sole carbon and nitrogen 
sources salts (1.18 g K2HPO4.3H2O and 0.25 g MgSO4.7H2O per liter of 
dH2O) and 50 μM of FeCl3. Iron-depleted casein medium is identical to the 
iron-supplied casein medium but instead of FeCl3 supplementation, this 
medium contains 100 μg/ml of human apo-transferrin (Sigma, T2036) and 
20 mM sodium bicarbonate to deplete available iron and induce pyoverdine 
production. The medium with no constraints contains the same salt 
solutions as the other media, low iron CAA (BD, Ref: 223050) (1% w/v) as 
the sole carbon source and 50 μM of FeCl3. All cultures were incubated at 
37oC with aeration (240 rpm, New Brunswick E25/E25R Shaker) for the 
incubation times indicated. Cell densities were estimated by measuring 
absorbance (Abs) at 600 nm (OD600) in a Thermo Spectronic Helios δ 
spectrophotometer. 
Determination of genotypic frequencies  
Estimation of the frequencies of each strain in the co-cultures was 
performed by scoring fluorescence and colony morphology of colonies 
obtained from plating serial PBS dilutions of the cultures. For each 
individual sample, three aliquots (of 50µl - 200µl, as appropriated) were 
plated into LB agar plates, which were used as technical replicates. Then, 
CFUs/ml were calculated by scoring different colony morphologies on each 
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plate. A stereoscope (Zeiss Stereo Lumar V12) with a CFP filter was used 
to distinguish pyoverdine producers, which are fluorescent, from the non-
fluorescent pvdS mutants (Ghoul et al., 2014b; Jiricny et al., 2010). lasR 
mutant colonies have distinct colony morphology: smaller with smooth 
edges whereas elastase producers are larger with rugged edges (Ghoul et 
al., 2014b). To validate the phenotypic scoring all colonies used to 
determine the frequency from day 18 of the propagation experiments 
(Figure 20D) were tested by PCR with primers for the lasR and pvdS 
genes. The PCR data confirmed the phenotypic scoring with 100% 
accuracy. 
Competition experiments  
We propagated six replicates under four different conditions (Figure 
20). Prior to start the competition experiments, all strains were inoculated, 
from frozen stocks, in medium containing 1% (w/v) casein and 1% (w/v) 
CAA in salts solution (same as in iron-supplied casein medium, described 
above) for 36 hours at 37oC temperature with shaking (240 rpm). Cells 
were then washed with PBS four times, to remove any residual extracellular 
factor. Next after measuring cell densities (OD600), cultures were 
normalized to OD600 = 1.0 and used to inoculate the various media as 
described in the text and figures. The different strains were diluted into 
fresh media, at different ratios as specified, to a starting initial OD600 = 0.05. 
For short term competitions the relative frequencies were determined by 
plating an aliquot of each culture at the beginning of the experiment (t = 0), 
and after 48 hours of incubation. For long-term competitions, the relative 
frequencies were determined at t = 0, and thereafter every 48 hours before 
each passage. At the end of every 48 hours, 1.5 μl of each culture was 
transferred to 1.5ml of fresh medium (bottle-neck of 1/1000). 
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Statistical analysis  
Independent biological replicates were separately grown from the 
frozen stocks of each strain. Each experiment was performed at least twice, 
with three biological replicates, except in Figure 17A where one experiment 
has only two biological replicates. Each figure (or figure panel) includes 
data from the biological replicates of at least two experiments. The sample 
size (N), corresponds to the total numbers of independent biological 
replicates in each figure panel and is provided in the corresponding figure 
legends. Relative fitness was used to determine the cheating capacity of 
each mutant. For both lasR and pvdS strains, the relative fitness (ω) was 
calculated as the frequency change over 48 hours relative to the rest of the 
strains in the mixture, using the following formula ω = ffinal (1 - finitial) / finitial (1 
- ffinal) where finitial is the mean of the initial proportion measured (as 
described above) at the beginning of the competitions while ffinal is the mean 
of the final proportions of the mutant after 48 hours of competition (Ghoul et 
al., 2014b; Jiricny et al., 2010). We used Mann-Whitney test which is a non-
parametric test that does not account for normality and it is more suitable 
for the sample size used in each experiment (5<N<20). For multiple 
corrections, we used Kruskal-Wallis test with Dunn’s correction. For all 
statistical analyses, we used GraphPad Prism 6 software 
(http://www.graphpad.com/scientific-software/prism). 
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 Modelling Cheating and the Chapter III:
Tragedy of the Commons  
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Preliminary notes 
The author of the thesis participated in the planning and analysis of 
all the experiments presented in this chapter. The author executed all the 
experiments shown in this chapter. Part of this chapter is included in the 
publication titled as “Cheating on orthogonal social traits prevents the 
tragedy of the commons in Pseudomonas aeruginosa”. (Manuscript 
submitted to bioRxiv: http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2017/03/19/118240) 
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Abstract 
Public goods (PG) cooperation is ubiquitous in many levels of life. 
The dynamics of cooperation and the dilemma that the cheating poses are 
the focus of many studies in fields ranging from economics to biology. 
Thus, understanding the dynamics of the PG cooperation and competition 
has a tremendous importance. Here, we build a simple mathematical model 
to simulate various PG games to understand the main parameters that 
govern these dynamics. We, first explore a minimal model, what would 
happen in a simple PG game with two players, cooperators and cheaters 
for a single trait. We show that only the cost of the cooperative trait 
determines the speed of the cheater invasion, and the difference between 
the benefit and the cost of a cooperative trait determines the intensity of the 
tragedy of the commons. We then model quorum sensing (QS) regulation 
of a PG trait implements, and show how it prevents cooperation from 
getting extinct. Then, as a novel approach, we test a scenario in which 
multiple games are being played by multiple players, where each player 
has a different role in each game. This scenario is more similar to that 
individuals often face in natural settings. Overall, the model simulates the 
experimental observations successfully by using only a few parameters, the 
cost and benefit parameters of each social trait, and the QS regulation of a 
trait which affects the cost and benefit parameters.  
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Introduction 
Bacteria, being prokaryotic minuscule organisms, heavily depend on 
molecules that operate outside of their cells (Bachmann et al., 2013; Popat 
et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2013; West et al., 2007a; Zhou et al., 2014). 
Many of these exo-products behave as public goods up to a degree of their 
accessibility (Bachmann et al., 2013; Jiricny et al., 2014). The more the 
public goods are accessible by all the organisms in the population, higher 
the selective pressure for cheating (Bachmann et al., 2013; Kümmerli and 
Brown, 2010). Cheating, via benefiting from public goods with no or little 
contribution, is considered as one of the obstacles needed to be defined 
and analyzed to be able to understand the dynamics of interbacterial 
cooperation (Ghoul et al., 2014a). 
Studies showed that cheating as a phenomenon can be observed in 
vitro (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; Sandoz et al., 2007; Wang 
et al., 2015), in vivo (Czechowska et al., 2014; Rumbaugh et al., 2009) and 
in natural populations (Cordero and Polz, 2014; Katzianer et al., 2015; 
Winstanley et al., 2016). Other studies also confirmed that cheating 
mutants can arise spontaneously in populations where cooperative 
behaviors are necessary for survival, and can drive the whole population to 
extinction by increasing in frequency (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et al., 
2012; Wang et al., 2015). Laboratory experiments demonstrated that 
engineered cheating mutants can increase in frequency in populations 
where cooperation is needed (Diggle et al., 2007). This creates the 
paradoxical outcome of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968; 
MacLean, 2008; Rankin et al., 2007). The tragedy of the commons 
happens when individuals increase their individual fitness over the 
competition for a public good and cause a decrease in the fitness of the 
overall population by exhausting that public good (Hardin, 1968; Rankin et 
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al., 2007). In bacterial cooperation, the tragedy of the commons is generally 
observed when cheating organisms increase in fitness by avoiding the cost 
of public good production and using the public good produced by the 
cooperator organisms (Asfahl et al., 2015; Dandekar et al., 2012; Wang et 
al., 2015). This frequency increase of the mutant can only reach to a level 
where the public good concentration cannot provide the fitness benefit that 
it otherwise would in a cooperative population. When that happens, the 
numbers of all the individuals would go down to the levels of the cheating 
mutants when they grow alone (Chapter II). 
Various mechanisms that prevent cheating and eventually avoid a 
possible tragedy of the commons are described in literature, such as 
quorum sensing (Allen et al., 2016), privatization (Dandekar et al., 2012; 
Estrela et al., 2016), spatial structure (Kreft, 2004), metabolic prudence 
(Xavier et al., 2011). It is tremendously important to dissect the conditions 
under which mechanisms operate to prevent cheater invasions and 
maintain cooperation. Although there is a large body of literature on 
interbacterial cooperation and cheating, experimentally and theoretically, 
modelling cheating to predict the tragedy of the commons, or the lack 
thereof which would be the maintenance of the population is yet to be 
focused on.  
In this study, we explore simple mathematical models with continuous 
replicator equations. We show that costs and benefits of the cooperative 
traits are the main determinants of the outcome of the public goods 
competitions between cooperators and cheaters in multiple scenarios. This 
simple model allows us to explore the dynamics of multiple constraint-
multiple trait scenarios and also the effects of quorum sensing to cheating 
behavior and the tragedy of the commons. Our results demonstrate with 
simple models of cooperator and cheater dynamics in single or multiple 
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public good games, how the onset and the intensity of the tragedy of the 
commons can be predicted, and how QS regulation can affect that. 
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Results 
Predicting the tragedy of the commons for one trait-one 
constraint scenarios 
To understand the main factors determining the dynamics of 
competition among cooperators and cheaters in a simple ‘one trait-one 
constraint’ scenario, we built a simple mathematical model assuming that 
the fate of cooperators and cheaters is governed by the costs and the 
benefits of the cooperative traits. The model assumes that the cost (c) of a 
cooperative trait is lower than the benefit (b) associated with this trait 
(b>c>0). The model also assumes that the benefit provided by the 
cooperative trait is equal for the entire population, as it would be in the case 
of an equally accessible public good in a well-mixed environment. Spatial 
structure, diffusion, or privatization, which would alter the benefit gained 
from the public good for cooperators and cheaters asymmetrically, were not 
considered in the model. The parameters used are described in Table 2. 
Table 2. Parameters for single cooperative trait public goods game 
Symbols Descriptions 
coop Cooperator 
ch Cheater 
c Cost of the cooperative trait 
b Benefit gained from the cooperative trait 
ω0 Fitness without the additional fitness effects of the cooperative traits (basal 
fitness) 
ωcoop Fitness of the cooperator of the both cooperative traits 
ωch Fitness of the cheater of the cooperative trait 
?̅? Mean fitness of the entire population (A proxy for OD600 or CFUs/ml) 
pcoop Frequency of the cooperator of the both cooperative traits in the entire 
population 
pch Frequency of the cheater of the cooperative trait in the entire population 
 
We define the fitness of a cooperator and a cheater mixed in an 
environment where the public goods trait that this mutant cheats on as: 
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ωcoop = ω0 + b (1 – pch) – c    [1] 
ωch = ω0 + b (1 – pch)     [2] 
As it can be seen from the fitness equations above, the cost (c) that 
cheater avoids is the only difference between the fitness of the cooperator 
and the fitness of the cheater. 
The change in the mean fitness is given by: 
?̅? = Σi pi(t) ωi = ω0 + pcoop(t) ωcoop + pch(t) ωch 
 = ω0 + (b – c) (1 – pch(t))   [3] 
Mean fitness (?̅?) is used as a proxy for the biomass (OD600 or 
CFUs/ml values) as the value c indicates the energy spent for the 
cooperative action instead of increasing the biomass, and the value b 
indicates the increase in biomass due to the benefit gained from the 
cooperative action, and the value ω0 is the biomass of the population 
without the effect of any cooperative action. 
We assume that the frequencies of cooperators and cheaters change 
by a replicator equation system in a homogeneous environment, and 
ignoring stochastic effects:  
dpcoop / dt = pcoop(t) (ωcoop – ?̅?) = pcoop(t) (– c pch(t))  [4] 
dpch / dt = pch(t) (ωch – ?̅?) = pch(t) (c (1 – pch(t)))  [5] 
As it can be seen from the equations above, the change in frequency 
of the strains, when they are mixed, only depends on the c value and not 
the b value. This is because the model assumes that the public good is fully 
and equally accessible by each player (both coop and ch) in the game. 
In particular, the change in frequency of the cheater is given by: 
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pch(t) = (pch(0) e
ct) / ((1 – pch(0)) + pch(0) e
ct)  [6] 
The equation above describes that by knowing the initial frequency of 
the cheater (pch(0)), the cost of the cooperative trait (c), and the time 
duration (t) that the competition takes (cumulative numbers of cell divisions 
are used as arbitrary units of time in our model, see Appendix), the 
frequency of the cheater at that given time (pch(t)) can be predicted. 
By combining [3] and [6], we can express ?̅? as: 
?̅? = ω0 + (b – c) (1 – (pch(0) e
ct) / ((1 - pch(0)) + pch(0) e
ct)) [7] 
As can be seen by the equation above (Equation [7]), the mean 
fitness is affected both by the benefit gained from the cooperative trait (b) 
and the cost spent in the cooperative trait (c), as well as the basal fitness 
(ω0), and the initial frequency of the cheater (pch(0)). 
When we use this mathematical model to simulate a competition 
between a cooperator and a cheater for a public good that is equally 
accessible by both of the players, we obtain the simulation in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34. Dynamics of ‘one trait-one constraint’ cooperator - cheater 
competition 
Left Y-axes show ?̅?, the mean fitness of the entire population, which is a 
proxy of OD600 or CFUs/ml values prior to subculture (black line) (Equation 
[7]). Right Y-axes show the frequencies of pcoop (e.g. WT, purple), pch (e.g. 
lasR, red) (Equation [5]). X-axes show the time, represented as the 
cumulative number of cell divisions as arbitrary units to relate the dynamics 
in Chapter II (see Appendix). Values given to the parameters: pcoop(0)= 0.9, 
pch(0)=0.1, c=0.01, b=3.4, ω0=0.2. 
As it can be seen in the figure above, the mutant (ch, red), reaches 
fixation given enough time (numbers of cumulative cell divisions, see 
Appendix). The increase in the frequency of the mutant also causes a 
drastic decrease in the mean fitness. This can be interpreted as the tragedy 
of the commons. Here the magnitude of the cost spent, or the c value, is 
the determinant of the onset of the tragedy of the commons (Figure 35). 
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Figure 35. The cost of public good production determines the onset of 
the tragedy of the commons. 
Axes and the rest of the parameters are as in Figure 34 except for the c 
values which are shown on the figure and noted for each panel. 
The fitness equations show that the benefit gained from the public 
goods (b) can only affect the magnitude of the decrease in the mean fitness 
once the cheater reaches a frequency near fixation. To simulate this we 
give various b values to our model (Figure 36). 
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Figure 36. The benefit gained from the public good production 
determines the severity of the tragedy of the commons. 
Axes and the rest of the parameters are as in Figure 34 except for the b 
values which are shown on the figure and noted for each panel. 
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Simulations of quorum sensing regulation for preventing 
cooperation from getting extinct 
Quorum sensing is a mechanism that allows bacteria to regulate 
certain genes via asserting their cell densities by secreting and detecting 
small signalling molecules called autoinducers. When the concentration of 
these molecules increases, the regulation of associated genes in the 
bacterial genome also alters. This allows bacteria to control the expression 
of these genes depending on the numbers of cells in a given space (Figure 
5). QS is known to control various public good synthesis genes. This allows 
bacteria to produce public goods only when the cell densities of the 
producers are high enough to get the benefits of this action directly (Allen et 
al., 2016; Pollitt et al., 2014; Popat et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2003). 
Therefore, QS is hypothesized to be one of the mechanisms to prevent 
cheater invasions. We tested this in an experimental setting demonstrated 
in Chapter II indeed QS can prevent the cooperators from an extinction 
(Figure 30).  
Table 3. Parameters for the QS regulation 
Symbols Descriptions 
th Quorum threshold (as a function of the non-QS strain frequency) 
n Hill coefficient for the slope of the inhibition of the QS-regulated public good 
 
We, therefore, want to show with a simple mathematical model which 
parameters affect the stabilization of cooperation in a cooperative system 
with QS regulation (Table 3). To do that we chose to use a Hill function to 
model QS regulation of a PG trait as shown below: 
f(pch) = 1 / (1 + (pch / th)
n)    [8] 
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Then we introduced this Hill function (Equation [8]) to our simple 
model (Equations [1] and [2]), where the cost (c) and benefit (b) of the 
cooperative trait are reduced with a slope, n, when the frequency of the 
cheater (pch) reaches a given threshold value, th. 
ωcoop = ω0 + b (1 – pch) (1 / (1 + (pch / th)
n)) – c (1 / (1 + (pch / th)
 n))  [9] 
ωch = ω0 + b (1 – pch) (1 / (1 + (pch / th)
 n)    [10] 
 According to these fitness equations, the frequencies can be expressed as: 
dpcoop / dt = pcoop(t) (ωcoop – ?̅?)   
= pcoop(t) ((– c pch(t)) / ((pch(t) / th)
n + 1))  [11] 
 dpch/ dt = pch(t) (ωch – ?̅?)   
= pch(t) ((c (1 - pch(t))) / ((pch(t) / th)
n + 1))  [12] 
In this scenario, the mean fitness would be expressed as: 
?̅? = Σi pi(t) ωi = ω0 + pcoop(t) ωcoop + pch(t) ωch 
= ω0 + ((b – c) (1 – pch(t))) / ((pch(t) / th)
n + 1)  [13] 
When we use this mathematical model to simulate a competition 
between a cooperator and a cheater for a public good where there is QS 
regulation for the cooperative trait, we obtain the numerical solutions below 
(Figure 37 and Figure 38). 
As it can be seen in Figure 37, the rate of inhibition of PG trait, which 
decreases the cost and the benefit of the trait gradually, given a fixed 
threshold value (th), can affect the outcome of the PG competition between 
the cooperator (which has an intact QS system) and the cheater (which is a 
mutant in QS regulation and the production of the PG that is regulated via 
that QS system). The smaller the n value is, the longer it takes for QS 
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regulation to diminish the cost and benefit of the PG trait (or in biological 
scenarios, it takes longer for the genes responsible for PG production to 
turn off). Thus smaller n values are more likely to fail to preserve 
cooperation from getting extinct (as in blue and orange lines). The mean 
fitness of the populations, however, decreases to the monoculture cheater 
levels in all cases, as the benefit is diminished via QS when the frequency 
of the cheater increases. This decrease happens earlier when the n value 
is higher. 
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Figure 37. Simulations demonstrating the effects of the QS regulation 
via gradual inhibition with a rate n  
(A) shows how various values of n, can affect the regulation of the PG trait 
via QS regulation, X-axis shows the frequency of the cheater (pch), Y-axis 
shows the level of trait regulation (1 means gene is fully ON, or cost and 
benefit are at maximum, and 0 means gene is fully OFF, or cost and benefit 
are 0). (B) shows the effects of different rates of PG inhibition via QS 
regulation on the frequency of the cheater during a competition with a 
cooperator. (C) shows the effects of different rates of PG inhibition via QS 
regulation on the mean fitness of the population. (D) and (E) are the same 
as (B) and (C) but show a smaller window of time during the competition to 
assess the differences on the frequency of the cheater and the mean fitness 
that different values of n causes. Y-axes in (B) and (D) show the frequency 
of the cheater (pch). Y-axes in (C) and (E) show the mean fitness (?̅?). X-axes 
in (B), (C), (D), and (E) show the time as cumulative number of cell divisions 
as an arbitrary unit. The rest of the parameters are as in Figure 34. 
Figure 38 shows that the threshold of inhibition of the PG trait, which 
decreases the cost and the benefit of the trait when a certain level of 
frequency of the cheater is reached, given a fixed rate of decrease (n), can 
affect the outcome of the PG competition between the cooperator (which 
has an intact QS system) and the cheater (which is a mutant in QS 
regulation and the production of the PG that is regulated via that QS 
system). The higher the th value is, the more likely is for the cheater to 
reach fixation (pch = 1). Thus higher th values are more likely to fail to 
preserve cooperation from getting extinct (as in red and purple lines). The 
mean fitness of the populations, however, decreases to the monoculture 
cheater levels in all cases, as the benefit is diminished via QS when the 
frequency of the cheater increases. This decrease happens earlier when 
the th value is smaller. 
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As it can be seen in our simulations, a quorum sensing mechanism 
that diminishes the cost and the benefit of the public good production can 
prevent the total fixation of the cheater by removing its competitive 
advantage that comes from the cost paid by the cooperator. Thus the 
cooperators can avoid extinction. 
 
Figure 38. Simulations demonstrating the effects of the QS regulation 
via inhibition at a threshold th  
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(A) shows how various values of th, can affect the regulation of the PG trait 
via QS regulation, X-axis shows the frequency of the cheater (pch), Y-axis 
shows the level of trait regulation (1 means gene is fully ON, or cost and 
benefit are at maximum, and 0 means gene is fully OFF, or cost and benefit 
are 0). (B) shows the effects of different thresholds of PG inhibition via QS 
regulation on the frequency of the cheater during a competition with a 
cooperator. (C) shows the effects of different thresholds of PG inhibition via 
QS regulation on the mean fitness of the population. (D) and (E) are the 
same as (B) and (C) but show a smaller window of time during the 
competition to assess the differences in the frequency of the cheater and the 
mean fitness that different values of th causes. Y-axes in (B) and (D) show 
the frequency of the cheater (pch). Y-axes in (C) and (E) show the mean 
fitness (?̅?). X-axes in (B), (C), (D), and (E) show the time as cumulative 
number of cell divisions as an arbitrary unit. The rest of the parameters are 
as in Figure 34. 
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Changing roles in a simultaneously played multiple public 
goods games 
After studying a single cooperative trait and its associated cooperator-
cheater dynamics on public goods games, we focused on the multiple 
public goods games played by a full cooperator (coop.) and the cheaters of 
each public goods production (ch1 and ch2). We modified the model in the 
previous section. This model also assumes that the costs (c1 and c2) of the 
cooperative traits are lower than the benefits (b1 and b2) of their associated 
traits (b1>c1>0 and b2>c2>0). The model also assumes that the benefits 
provided by the cooperative traits are equally accessible by the entire 
population, as it would be in the case of an equally accessible public good 
in a well-mixed environment. Spatial structure, diffusion, or privatization, 
which would alter the benefit gained from the public good for cooperators 
and cheaters asymmetrically, were not considered in this model either. The 
parameters used are described in Table 4. 
Table 4. Parameters for the mathematical model for the 3-way public 
goods game  
Symbols Descriptions 
c1 Cost of the 1
st
 cooperative trait 
c2 Cost of the 2
nd
 cooperative trait 
b1 Benefit gained from the 1
st
 cooperative trait 
b2 Benefit gained from the 2
nd
 cooperative trait 
ω0 Fitness without the additional fitness effects of the cooperative traits (basal 
fitness) 
ωcoop Fitness of the cooperator of the both cooperative traits 
ωch1 Fitness of the cheater of the 1
st
 cooperative trait 
ωch2 Fitness of the cheater of the 2
nd
 cooperative trait 
?̅? Mean fitness of the entire population (A proxy for OD600 or CFUs/ml) 
pcoop Frequency of the cooperator of the both cooperative traits in the entire 
population 
pch1 Frequency of the cheater of the 1
st
 cooperative trait in the entire population 
pch2 Frequency of the cheater of the 2
nd
 cooperative trait in the entire population 
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 Simple 3-way public goods model  1.
We define the fitness of a cooperator and two cheaters mixed in an 
environment where both traits that these mutants cheat on as: 
ωcoop = ω0 + b1 (1 – pch1) + b2 (1 – pch2) – c1 – c2  [14] 
ωch1 = ω0 + b1 (1 – pch1) + b2 (1 – pch2) – c2   [15] 
ωch2 = ω0 + b1 (1 – pch1) + b2 (1 – pch2) – c1   [16] 
As can be seen from the fitness definitions of these three players, the 
cheaters always have a higher fitness than the cooperator due to the costs 
(c1 or c2) saved. Assuming a homogeneous environment, and ignoring 
stochastic effects, the population changes according to the replicator 
equation system: 
dpcoop / dt = pcoop(t) (ωcoop – ?̅?) = pcoop(t) (– c1 pch1(t) – c2 pch2(t)) [17] 
dpch1 / dt = pch1(t) (ωch1 – ?̅?) = pch1(t) (c1 (1 – pch1(t)) – c2 pch2(t)) [18] 
dpch2 / dt = pch2(t) (ωch2 – ?̅? ) = pch2(t) (c2 (1 – pch2(t)) – c1 pch1(t)) [19] 
The change in the mean fitness is given by: 
?̅? = Σi pi(t) ωi = ω0 + pcoop(t) ωcoop + pch1(t) ωch1 + pch2(t) ωch2  
= ω0 + (b1 – c1) (1 – pch1(t)) + (b2 – c2) (1 – pch2(t)) [20] 
 Figure 39 shows the predicted mean fitness and final frequencies of 
the different strains in the population assuming different c1/c2 ratios. It can 
be easily seen that cooperators will always go extinct and that the two 
cheaters can only co-exist when c1 = c2. 
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Figure 39. Mathematical model for the final frequencies of the three 
strains in relation to the ratio of c1/c2 
In Right-Y axes, frequencies of cooperator of both cooperative traits 
(purple), cheater of the 1
st
 cooperative trait (red), and cheater of the 2nd 
cooperative trait (blue) in relation to the ratio of c1/c2 either. In Left-Y axes, 
the mean fitness, ?̅?, is shown in black. The values given to the parameters 
of the simulations are: pcoop(0)=0.8, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, 0.001≤c1<0.199, 
b1=1.5, c2=0.1, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1, time (as arbitrary CCD)=1800.  
Whenever c1 ≠ c2, then the cheater that produces the more costly trait 
will lose. Therefore, the relation between c1 and c2 determines which 
cheater will dominate the population, independently of the benefits of these 
cooperative traits. On the other hand, the yield of the population will depend 
on, ?̅?, which is affected by the difference between b and c values of each 
trait. 
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We simulated the four scenarios (Figure 40) corresponding to the 
conditions in Figure 20. In Figure 40A and Figure 40C, the cooperator for 
both traits (WT) and the cheater of the 1st cooperative trait compete 
(pcoop(0) = 0.9 and pch1(0) = 0.1), while the cheater of the 2
nd cooperative 
trait is absent (hence pch2(0)=0). Whereas, in Figure 40B and Figure 40D all 
three strains compete (pcoop(0) = 0.8 and pch1(0) = pch2(0) = 0.1). In Figure 
40A and Figure 40B, only the 1st cooperative trait is produced (b1 > c1 > 0, 
whereas b2 = c2 = 0) while in Figure 40C and Figure 40D both traits are 
expressed (c2 > c1 > 0 and b1 > b2 > 0). The c1/c2 ratio reflects the ratios of 
the relative fitnesses in Figure 17C and Figure 17D. The time scale of the 
simulations reflects the CCD as a more meaningful scale than days or 
numbers of generations (Lee et al., 2011; Luria and Delbrück, 1943). CCD 
values were chosen according to the final number of cells measured in the 
competition in Figure 17, where the CCD were significantly higher in iron-
supplied casein medium than in iron-depleted casein medium for the same 
time period. ω0, b1, and b2 are chosen to reflect the growth yields in Figure 
15 and Figure 14B. 
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Figure 40. Simulation of four main scenarios similar to Figure 20 
(A) one mutant-one constraint, (B) two mutants-one constraint. (C) one 
mutant-two constraints, (D) two mutants-two constraints. Left Y-axes show 
?̅?, the mean fitness of the entire population, which is a proxy of OD600 or 
CFUs/ml values prior to subculture (black lines). Right Y-axes show the 
frequencies of pcoop (e.g. WT, purple), pch1 (e.g. lasR, red) and pch2 (e.g. 
pvdS, blue). X-axes show the cumulative number of cell divisions as 
arbitrary units. The values that are given to the parameters of the 
simulations are: (A) pcoop(0)=0.9, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0, c1=0.01, b1=3.4, 
c2=0, b2=0, ω0=0.2; (B) pcoop(0)=0.8, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, c1=0.01, b1=3.4, 
c2=0, b2=0, ω0=0.2; (C) pcoop(0)=0.9, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0, c1=0.01, b1=1.5, 
c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1; (D) pcoop(0)=0.8, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, c1=0.01, 
b1=1.5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1. Note that the values of parameters used 
in these simulations are chosen to reflect approximately the relation between 
the values observed in Figure 15, Figure 14, Figure 17, Figure 20.  
The results of the model for the four scenarios (Figure 40) resemble 
the experimental data from Figure 20, explaining changes in frequencies 
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and the mean fitness observed reasonably well. However, this simple 
model always predicts complete fixation of the winning mutant (Figure 40), 
and cannot explain the lack of fixation of the mutants observed 
experimentally with lasR (Figure 20 A, B, and C) and pvdS (Figure 20D). 
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 Simple 3-way public goods model including quorum sensing 2.
Given that the lasR gene and elastase production are regulated via 
quorum sensing, we hypothesized that QS could be responsible for the lack 
of fixation of lasR mutant. QS regulation should reduce both the cost and 
the benefit of elastase production when the cooperators are below the QS 
threshold as the cells will not be producing it. We therefore modelled the 
effect of QS on fitness equations by assuming a Hill function where the cost 
(c1) and benefit (b1) of the 1
st cooperative trait are sharply reduced when 
the frequency the cheater of the1st cooperative trait (pch1) reaches a given 
threshold value (th) (Equation [8]) 
Fitness equations of the cooperator and the cheaters are given as: 
ωcoop = ω0 + b1 (1 – pch1) (1 / (1 + (pch1 / th)
n))   
+ b2 (1 – pch2) – c1 (1 / (1 + (pch1 / th)
n)) – c2 [21] 
ωch1 = ω0 + b1 (1 – pch1) (1 / (1 + (pch1 / th)
n)) + b2 (1 – pch2) – c2     [22] 
ωch2 = ω0 + b1 (1 – pch1) (1 / (1 + (pch1 / th)
n))  
+ b2 (1 – pch2) – c1 (1 / (1 + (pch1 / th)
n))   [23] 
The change in the mean fitness is given by: 
?̅? = ω0 + ((b1 – c1) (1 – pch1(t)) / (1 / (1 + (pch1 / th)
n)))  
+ (b2 – c2) (1 – pch2(t))     [24] 
 In this case, fixation of one mutant can only happen if c1˂c2. When 
c1≥c2, both cheaters can co-exist in the population (Figure 41). 
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Figure 41. Mathematical model for the final frequencies of the three 
strains in relation to the ratio of c1/c2, with the influence of quorum 
sensing (QS) regulation on the 1
st
 cooperative trait 
Axes are as in Figure 39. The values given to the parameters of the 
simulations are: pcoop(0)=0.8, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, 0.001≤c1<0.199, 
b1=1.5, c2=0.1, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1, time (as arbitrary CCD)=1800, n=30 and 
th=0.8. 
As shown in Figure 42, the results of the simulations of the modified 
model including QS for the four experimental conditions predict accurately 
both the frequency dynamics and the reduction in population size (assumed 
to be related to the mean fitness) as the cheaters spread. It is also now 
clear that by adding the QS regulation to the model the simulation predicts 
that lasR will not reach fixation.  
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Figure 42. Results of the mathematical model simulating the four 
scenarios in Figure 20  
Model includes quorum sensing regulation of the 1
st
 cooperative trait (b1 and 
c1 are negatively regulated via a Hill equation as a function of the frequency 
of the mutant of this trait, pch1). Left Y-axes show ?̅?, the mean fitness of the 
entire population which is a proxy of OD600 or CFUs/ml values prior to 
subculture (black lines). Right Y-axes show the frequencies of pcoop (e.g. WT, 
purple), pch1 (e.g. lasR, red) and pch2 (e.g. pvdS, blue). X-axes show the 
number of cell divisions as arbitrary units. The values that are given to the 
parameters of the simulations are: (A) pcoop(0)= 0.9, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0, 
c1=0.01, b1=3.4, c2=0, b2=0, ω0=0.2, th=0.8, n=30; (B) pcoop(0)= 0.8, 
pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, c1=0.01, b1=3.4, c2=0, b2=0, ω0=0.2, th=0.8, n=30; 
(C) pcoop(0)= 0.9, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0, c1=0.01, b1=1. 5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, 
ω0=0.1, th=0.8, n=30; (D) pcoop(0)= 0.8, pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, c1=0.01, 
b1=1.5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1, th=0.8, n=30. 
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We also simulated alternative scenarios in an environment where 
both traits are needed without QS regulation or with QS regulation (only the 
1st cooperative trait is regulated by QS): 
 When only the cooperator of both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) and 
the cheater of the 2nd cooperative trait (which is not regulated by quorum 
sensing, e.g. pvdS) are in competition, the cheater wins and reaches 
fixation as in the triple co-culture scenario, regardless of QS regulation of 
the 1st cooperative trait (Figure 43), while the mean fitness becomes:  
?̅? = ω0 + b1 – c1    [25] 
 
Figure 43. Simulation with two strains, full cooperator (WT) + cheater 
for the 2
nd
 cooperative trait, under conditions where both public goods 
are produced and c2>c1 
Left Y-axis show ?̅?, the mean fitness of the entire population which is a 
proxy of OD600 or CFUs/ml values prior to subculture (black lines). Right Y-
axis show the frequencies of pcoop (purple), and pch2 (blue). X-axis shows the 
cumulative number of cell divisions as arbitrary units. The values given to 
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the parameters of the simulations were: pcoop(0)=0.9, pch1(0)=0, pch2(0)=0.1, 
c1=0.01, b1=1.5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1. The results were the same 
regardless if the 1
st
 was considered to be regulated by QS (n=30, th=0.8) or 
not (n=0, th=0). 
When only two cheaters are in 1:1 competition, the cheater that saves 
the greater cost (here, the cheater of the 2nd cooperative trait since c2>c1) 
wins the competition and reaches fixation regardless of QS regulation of 
the 1st cooperative trait (Figure 44), while the mean fitness becomes: 
 ?̅? = ω0 + b1 – c1     [26] 
 
Figure 44. Simulation with the two cheaters competing with each other, 
under conditions where both public goods are produced and c2>c1  
Frequencies of pch1 (red), and pch2 (blue) are shown on the Right Y-axis. The 
other axes are as described in Figure 43. The values given to the 
parameters of the simulations were: pcoop(0)=0, pch1(0)=0.5, pch2(0)=0.5, 
c1=0.01, b1=1.5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1. The results were the same 
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regardless if QS regulation for the 1
st
 cooperative trait was considered 
(n=30, th=0.8) or not (n=0, th=0).  
When the cooperator of the both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) is 
competing with two mutants under conditions where the costs of both traits 
are equal (c1=c2), both cheaters increase in frequency until both of them 
reach 50% of the population (Figure 45), similarly with or without QS 
regulation of the 1st cooperative trait, while the mean fitness becomes: 
 ?̅? = ω0 + ½ (b1 + b2 – c1 – c2)       [27] 
 
Figure 45. Simulation for a 3-way competition with the cooperator of 
the both cooperative traits competing with two cheaters, under 
conditions where both public goods are produced and c2=c1 
Frequencies of pcoop (purple), pch1 (red), and pch2 (blue) are shown on the 
Right Y-axis. The other axes are as described in Figure 43. The values 
given to the parameters of the simulations were: pcoop(0)=0.8, pch1(0)=0.1, 
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pch2(0)=0.1, c1=0.025, b1=1.5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1.The results were 
the same regardless if QS regulation for the 1
st
 cooperative trait was 
considered (n=30, th=0.8) or not (n=0, th=0).  
When the cooperator of the both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) is 
competing with two mutants under conditions where the c1>c2, then the 
more drastic tragedy-inducing cheater becomes the winner of the 3-way 
competition. In this case, when the 1st cooperative is not regulated by QS, 
the cheater of the 1st cooperative trait wins the 3-way competition and 
causes a drastic collapse, with the mean fitness (Figure 46A):  
?̅? = ω0 + b2 – c2    [28] 
However, when the 1st cooperative trait is regulated by QS, the 
cheater of the 1st cooperative, while it still wins the competition, it can only 
increase in frequency until the QS threshold (th=0.8) and thus, cannot 
reach fixation (Figure 46B); and the mean fitness becomes:  
?̅? = ω0 + (b1 – c1) (0.4) + (b2 – c2) (0.8)  [29] 
As a result, the cooperator of the both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) 
persists in the population. Therefore, presumably, the population has a 
greater chance to recover if the environmental conditions change. In 
conclusion, the QS regulation becomes relevant only under conditions 
where the mutant for the QS-regulated trait (here the cheater of the 1st 
cooperative trait) is not completely outcompeted. 
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Figure 46. Simulation for a 3-way competition with the cooperator of 
the both cooperative traits competing with two cheaters, under 
conditions where both public goods are produced and c1>c2  
Frequencies of pcoop (purple), pch1 (red) and pch2 (blue) are shown on the 
Right Y-axes. The other axes are as described in Figure 43. The values 
given to the parameters of the simulations were: (A) pcoop(0)=0.8, 
pch1(0)=0.1, pch2(0)=0.1, c1=0.04, b1=1.5, c2=0.025, b2=0.25, ω0=0.1, n = 0, th 
= 0; (B) same as in (A) except n=30 and th=0.8, as QS regulation was 
considered for the 1
st
 cooperative trait.  
We conclude that quorum sensing regulation of production of a public 
good prevents full domination of the QS cheater, maintaining cooperation in 
populations. However, if the cheater which wins is affected in the 
production of a public good that is not regulated via QS (e.g. pvdS) this 
mutant can dominate the entire population. In summary, the results 
obtained from our mathematical model (Figure 42) show that the dynamics 
observed in our propagation experiments in Figure 20 can be explained by 
the relationship between the cost values of two orthogonal cooperative 
traits and a quorum threshold that regulates both costs and benefits of one 
of these traits.  
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Discussion 
We showed that when there are no mechanisms to regulate the cost 
spent on producing the public good or the accessibility of the public good 
thus the benefit gained by each individual, the tragedy of the commons is 
inevitable in a continuously growing population in an unchanging 
environment. We further showed that the cost of the public good production 
determines the magnitude of the cheating or in other words the relative 
fitness advantage of the cheater. The difference between the cost and the 
benefit of the public goods, however, determines the severity of the 
population collapse when the cheater approaches fixation and causes a 
tragedy of the commons.  
Importantly, the model presented here considers that the costs and 
the benefits of different PG traits can be different. As a consequence, the 
difference between the costs avoided by each cheater mutant determines 
which cheater wins the competition and the relation between the benefit 
and cost difference determines the level of collapse after that mutant wins 
the competition and reaches fixation.  
In this chapter, we modelled QS regulation of a PG trait by using a 
Hill function. We assumed that an increase in cheater frequency would 
cause a decrease in the mean fitness (a proxy for cell densities). This 
assumption is supported by our experimental data in Chapter II. Thus, via a 
Hill function, our QS model decreases the cost and benefit of the PG trait 
that QS regulates when the frequency of the cheater increases. Using a Hill 
function allowed us to address the two aspects of quorum sensing 
regulation of PG traits, a threshold at which point gene regulation starts to 
be turned off, and a given rate for this alteration. We assume that QS 
regulation starts turning the genes for PG production off with a given rate 
(not instantaneously), and only after a threshold is reached by the cheater 
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frequency. The predictions of our model for QS regulation are strikingly 
coherent to our experimental findings in Chapter II (Figure 30, and Figure 
31).  
Furthermore our model shows that when multiple players play 
multiple PG games, by changing their roles in each game, or in other words 
a tri-partite PG games with a full cooperator, a cheater for one trait, and 
another cheater for the second trait; the cheaters cease to be full cheaters 
since they cooperate on the trait that they are not cheating. This changes 
the classic dynamics of one trait-one constraint (uni-directional) PG games. 
Importantly, the predictions that the model supports also explain the 
experimental findings of tri-partite PG game dynamics in the frequency 
changes of the strains, the change in the growth yields (mean fitness) and 
the fixation or the lack of fixation of the non-producers of the public goods 
(Figure 20).  
Overall, the simple mathematical model presented in this chapter 
sheds light on the understanding of which parameters govern the dynamics 
of the PG games in various scenarios. Knowing that a greater and 
unregulated cost could give a fitness advantage to one mutant strain to 
reach fixation in the population, or being able to determine the conditions 
that promote fixation of mutants of a high benefit – low cost trait that has 
the potential to cause a more drastic population collapse compared to a low 
benefit – high cost trait, can change the possible strategies for new 
experimental designs and therapeutic approaches to treat infections such 
as the ones affect CF patients. New cheater strains can be engineered to 
avoid a high costly trait with a minimum benefit which also cannot survive 
on its own (such as a mutant that can benefit the detoxification done by 
others but cannot survive in a toxic environment, e.g. a mutant in catalase 
or beta-lactamase production) to rapidly dominate the already existing 
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virulent bacterial population to drive the entire population to an ultimate 
collapse. 
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 General DiscussionChapter IV:
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Preliminary notes 
Part of this chapter is included in the publication titled as 
“Maintenance of cooperation for single and multiple social traits” which is a 
review paper that is under revision for Journal of Bacteriology. 
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Although there are a numerous and still growing number of well-
designed studies to understand the conditions that enable maintenance of 
cooperative behaviors in bacterial communities, there are also challenges 
that limit the understanding of microbial social dynamics. Most previous 
studies have focused on one cooperative trait and study how that trait is 
maintained against possible cheater invasions. Each study characterizes 
mechanisms (See Chapter I – Mechanisms to prevent cheating in microbial 
populations) that play a role for the cooperative trait that is studied. This 
method is valid and certainly there are specific mechanisms for maintaining 
bacterial cooperation yet to be discovered. However, the methods for 
quantifying bacterial cheating have to be assessed and discussed carefully. 
Cheating behavior has to be defined precisely and should be quantified. 
Parameters that affect the magnitude of the cheating behavior have to be 
evaluated. Only after these challenges are faced, sociomicrobiology can 
move its frontiers further and help developing new therapeutic approaches 
for complex infections such as in the chronic infections in the lungs of CF 
patients. 
First, it is important to determine if the cooperative trait of interest can 
be regulated by the cooperator as a response to external constraints. If the 
cooperative behavior is performed by the obligate cooperators, changing 
external factors can easily make cooperation vulnerable. When the 
cooperative trait is obligatory, meaning that it will be produced even when 
the product, the public good is costly but not giving any benefits, the non-
producers would be vastly advantageous. This is considered as the most 
suitable explanation for why most cooperative traits are facultative (Allen et 
al., 2016; Bruger and Waters, 2015; Dumas et al., 2013; Ghoul et al., 
2014a).  
The fact that most cooperative traits are facultative brings the 
requirement of studying that particular trait in the condition that it is needed 
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to increase the fitness of the cooperator or avoid a fitness decrease. An 
example of a well-documented facultative cooperation is the production of 
iron-siderophore molecule pyoverdine in P. aeruginosa studied here. 
Pyoverdine production is induced by the depletion of the iron concentration 
(Schalk and Guillon, 2013). To study pyoverdine production as a 
cooperative trait, first, iron concentration has to be depleted to the levels 
that the pyoverdine producing strain produces it in significant amounts that 
result in a fitness advantage in that environment (Ghoul et al., 2014b; 
Kümmerli and Ross-Gillespie, 2013). Otherwise, neither a cost nor a benefit 
due to this trait should be expected (Ghoul et al., 2014b). The advantage of 
the cheaters comes from avoiding the cost and reaping the benefits. When 
there are no costs to avoid or benefits to gain, cheating cannot be 
expected.  
The work presented in Chapter II shows that the mutants that are 
avoiding the cost of producing pyoverdine (pvdS) or elastase (lasR) can 
only behave as cheaters when the cost of producing pyoverdine or elastase 
is significantly great for the producers (Figure 17). We show that the 
change in cheating indicates the change in cost spent by the producers and 
this change can be controlled by altering the environment via adding or 
removing abiotic constraints (Figure 32). 
 Also to study cheating, the mutant has to be carefully selected. If the 
strain is isolated after spontaneous evolution, the genome of the mutant is 
better to be sequenced to rule out any other mutations which could affect 
the conclusion of the experiment. Asfahl et al. showed that when WT P. 
aeruginosa evolved in casein media, lasR mutations spontaneously arose. 
However before these mutations arose, an earlier mutation in psdR gene 
which gave cells a non-social advantage in the intake of dipeptides, the 
products of the digestion of casein by elastase, swept through the 
population, diminishing the cheating advantage of lasR mutants and 
Chapter IV 
127 
 
deferring a tragedy of the commons which could otherwise be caused by 
lasR cheating (Asfahl et al., 2015).  
If the mutant is genetically engineered, the genes to be manipulated 
have to be accurately chosen. A mutation in the genetic machinery of the 
cooperative trait can create a cheater mutant, as well as an obligate 
cooperator, a loner, or a loser (Table 1).  
Although the term “cheat” is ubiquitously used in various fields in 
biology, the meaning of it can vary (Ghoul et al., 2014a; West et al., 2007b). 
Most commonly sociomicrobiology studies define cheating as avoiding the 
cost of a cooperative trait, which increases the fitness or avoids decrease 
of the fitness of the recipients of this trait while gaining the benefit of it. 
Thus the conditions in which the cooperative trait is induced and to which 
intensity are extremely important.  
To be able to call a strain a cheater, it has to be shown first that the 
strain of interest has a growth defect compared to the cooperative strain in 
monocultures. Then, in mixture with the cooperator strain, at low frequency 
(since cheating is frequency dependent) the mutant strain of interest should 
increase in frequency while the population grows. The monoculture growth 
shows that although the mutant strain avoids the cost, not gaining the 
benefit of the cooperative trait gives its growth defect. However in the 
mixture, assuming that the public good is fully accessible to all the 
individuals, then the mutant should have the same benefits as the 
cooperator while avoiding the cost.  
Another important point while studying the emergence of cheaters is 
that avoiding the energy cost spent in the cooperative trait behaves as the 
selection coefficient to the cheater mutant only when the density of 
population increases. If there is no cell division, cheating has no effect on 
fitness and it is not observed since the measurement of cheating is 
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calculated via calculating the relative fitness, the relative change in the 
frequencies of each strain. A study done by Ghoul et al. demonstrated 
experimentally that pyoverdine cheats cannot invade WT populations when 
they are introduced during the stationary phase. However, it is hard to 
distinguish whether this is because the cells are not growing or the cost of 
pyoverdine is diminished at this stage of growth (Ghoul et al., 2016). If in a 
culture, no death or growth of the population is expected, then cheating 
behavior should not be expected either. Given this definition of cheating, 
this thesis discusses how cheating magnitude increases with the 
accumulated number of cell divisions rather than the real time units 
(seconds, minutes, hours, days etc.), or numbers of generations which 
overlap (Lee et al., 2011). We argue (in Chapter II and Chapter III) that the 
cost avoided by the cheater is similar to a selection coefficient in a 
competition between a WT strain and another strain which has a beneficial 
mutation. Therefore, we concluded that in these scenarios cumulative 
numbers of cell divisions must be used as it is a more meaningful unit of 
time since the frequency changes are caused by the differences in the 
growth rates which result in different numbers of cell divisions in a given 
time window. Numbers of generations could be misleading in this case 
because populations can have the same number of generations but a 
different number of cell divisions if the starting yields of the populations are 
different (see Appendix, Figure 48 and Figure 49). In the propagation 
experiments shown in this thesis, the magnitude of cheating is different 
under different conditions even when the number of generations is the 
same. This occurs due to differences in growth rates which result in a 
different number of cumulative cell divisions for the same period of time 
(For more discussion see Appendix). 
A better understanding of the interactions in polymorphic bacterial 
populations in complex environments not only provides insights into key 
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aspects of sociomicrobiology, but also can offer a theoretical framework for 
the development of new therapeutic strategies against bacterial populations 
where social mutants can invade. P. aeruginosa has been the focus of 
many clinical CF studies because social mutants such as lasR and pvdS 
are repeatedly observed in the lungs of chronically infected patients (Smith 
et al., 2006a; Winstanley et al., 2016). Recently, it was suggested that 
controlled introduction of engineered lasR or pvdS cheaters into the lungs 
of CF patients infected by P. aeruginosa might decrease the bacterial 
population by inducing a tragedy of the commons (Brown et al., 2009; 
Kümmerli, 2015; Rumbaugh et al., 2009). However, in the lungs, P. 
aeruginosa faces multiple constraints similar to the ones studied here: 
complex carbon sources and low iron concentrations. Thus, the order of the 
introduction of the cheaters, the composition of the bacterial population at 
the onset of the intervention, and the abiotic environmental conditions in the 
CF lungs are determinant for the ecological outcome of the population and 
the success of the intervention. For example, according to our results, 
introducing a pvdS mutant into a population containing lasR mutants in 
iron-limiting conditions might avert a drastic population collapse rather than 
triggering it. A study on the evolution of P. aeruginosa strains in the CF 
lungs showed that appearance of lasR mutations is followed by that of 
pvdS mutations (and other mutation affecting iron metabolism) (Smith et al., 
2006a). This might explain why a drastic population collapse does not take 
place in the CF lungs. Our results suggest that a successful clearance of a 
P. aeruginosa infection in CF patients via triggering a tragedy of the 
commons can be achieved if the cheaters are introduced when the 
environmental constraints are limited to the specific trait that the cheater 
strain cheats on. Importantly, modifications of the environmental conditions 
can contribute to this effect. For instance, our results predict that when a 
lasR mutant is introduced, the supply of extra iron could accelerate the 
drastic collapse caused by the expansion of lasR mutant (Figure 32B) and 
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presumably addition of AHLs, by forcing WT to constitutively cooperate, 
can promote complete fixation of lasR mutants (Figure 30B), therefore 
increasing the efficacy of this potential treatment. Our studies, do not take 
into account the effect of pvdS, lasR double mutant (we found no evidence 
for the emergence of double mutants within the period of our experiments), 
which have the potential to occur in vivo (Smith et al., 2006a). The effect of 
such double mutants should be investigated in the future. However, based 
on our results, we can speculate that double mutants should accelerate the 
collapse of the population. Indeed, we have preliminary data (data not 
shown) that in longer propagation experiment (in Figure 20D), de novo 
mutations can occur, which include pvdS, lasR double mutants. We further 
note that, while our pvdS mutant does not show any advantage in iron-
supplied medium (Figure 17B), some pyoverdine mutants in Pseudomonas 
fluorescens have been reported to be better adapted even in environments 
where iron concentration is not low and thus can be considered non-social 
mutations (Zhang and Rainey, 2013). The observation of these potentially 
non-social mutants indicates that iron-supplementation may sometimes fail 
as a potential intervention for clearance, highlighting the need for 
understanding the nature of these mutations and changes in dynamics 
caused by them. 
Finally, also as this thesis shows in detail in Chapter II, the biotic 
components of the population of interest should be assessed. To 
understand how cheating affects the dynamics of complex biological 
systems such as the multi-species and multi-strain infections of CF lungs, 
the complex web of inter-species and inter-strain interactions must be 
addressed. There has been a growing literature focusing the inter-species 
and inter-strain interactions in these infections. (Bassler, 1999; Brown and 
Taylor, 2010; Harrison and Buckling, 2009; Leinweber et al., 2017; Oliveira 
et al., 2014; Popat et al., 2017; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2015). Brown and 
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Taylor first established a framework for the evolution of joint social traits. 
They showed in their theoretical study that interestingly, selfish exploitation 
increased with increasing relatedness while maintaining social and asocial 
strategies stable (Brown and Taylor, 2010). Oliveira et al. showed in their 
theoretical study that for the evolution of cooperation among the producers 
of different public goods to be stable they must be in an intermediate 
genetic mixing. However, even this stable state poses a constraint that the 
strains that rely on the exchange of the public goods as a population are 
less fit than a population of individuals that can produce all the public goods 
independently (Oliveira et al., 2014). Ross-Gillespie et al. showed that the 
interactions between the two iron-siderophore production traits, production 
of pyoverdine and pyochelin, of P. aeruginosa can affect the evolution of 
these traits in long term where pyoverdine uni-directionally suppresses 
pyochelin production. They showed experimentally that under strong iron 
limitation (where pyoverdine is produced) pyoverdine cheaters arose and 
thus the loss of pyoverdine resulted in an increase in pyochelin production. 
However under moderate iron limitation (where pyochelin is produced), 
although pyochelin cheaters arose and the loss of pyochelin is observed, 
there was no increase in pyoverdine production due to the unidirectional 
link between these two social traits (Ross-Gillespie et al., 2015). Popat et 
al. demonstrated how two genetically independent social traits, production 
of iron-siderophore pyoverdine, and pseudomonas quorum sensing signal 
PQS can affect each other environmentally, by demonstrating that 
externally added PQS can increase the cheating magnitude of the 
pyoverdine mutants, as it alters the iron availability in the environment 
(Popat et al., 2017). Leinweber et al. showed a complex social web of 
interactions between P. aeruginosa, Burkholderia cenocepacia and a 
mutant strain of P. aeruginosa that acts as an iron-siderophore cheat can 
provide co-existence and a higher biodiversity. The roles in social 
behaviors such as cooperators, cheaters, and more recently loners are 
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described to have similar interaction systems to a rock-paper-scissor game 
(Inglis et al., 2016). Our experimental results demonstrated in Chapter II 
and mathematical simulations expressed in Chapter III grow on this 
literature and shed more light on the interbacterial cooperator and cheater 
dynamics of multiple social traits. We show that the cost values that the 
cheaters of different traits avoid vary, and the relationship among these 
cost values is what determines which cheater wins the competition. 
Additionally, we also demonstrate that mechanisms such as QS can 
sustain co-existence between mutants of different social traits by regulating 
the cost and benefit values of these traits. 
This growing literature and our results demonstrated in this thesis 
point out to challenges in the current understanding of cheating. When the 
multitude of the interactions among the players with different social roles 
increases, the social dynamics of the system would be more like a division 
of labor than a simple cooperator-cheater interaction. If a complex system 
such as the infection of CF lungs is taken into account, the social role of 
each individual becomes relative to each other and in the sum of the 
population.  
To have a simple analogy, a hunter-gatherer human population 
system could be imagined where the population needs both meat and 
vegetation consumption to grow and be maintained (Figure 47). In such 
population, both cooperation for meat scavenging, or hunting; and 
cooperation for vegetation collecting, or gathering are observed. It can be 
imagined that half of the population participates only in hunting and the 
other half participates only in gathering. If an anthropologist who studies 
this population only focuses on hunting as a cooperative trait, then they can 
misclassify the gatherers in the population as cheaters since from that point 
of view, the gatherers would be not hunting but yet still eating meat 
gathered by the hunters. And vice versa, if another anthropologist focuses 
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only on gathering behavior, they can assess the hunters as cheating 
individuals who are not contributing in gathering but still benefiting from the 
access to the vegetation brought by the gatherers. We define this as ‘the 
multiple traits hypothesis’, and argue that the roles of each group, both 
hunters and gatherers in this analogy, can only be correctly assessed if 
both traits are accounted simultaneously. Only then, it can be seen that the 
components of this populations were not cheaters but mutual partners 
(Figure 47).  
 
Figure 47. Multiple traits hypothesis 
134 
 
A gatherer collects roots and vegetables but consumes not only the 
resources that they collect but also meat that is collected by hunters. A 
hunter, on the other hand, hunts for prey but consumes not only the meat 
that they provided but also the vegetables and roots scavenged by the 
gatherers. A uni-directional approach to this di-partite system can lead to the 
mislabeling of either company as cheaters for the actions that they are not 
participating but still gaining benefit from.  
(Image credit: Image hand-drawn by Özhan Özkaya and digitally edited by Rômulo 
Areal, inspired from the illustration “A Kali'na hunter with a woman gatherer” from the 
scanned version of “Na'na Kali'na: Une histoire des Kali'na en Guyane” 
More parallels can be drawn between more complex organisms and 
bacteria to this extent. Such as a single human that is stranded in a 
deserted island has to overcome all the external forces by themselves, thus 
possess all the traits for their survival ranging from hunting and gathering to 
cloth making, cooking, farming, herding etc. This life style can be similar to 
a planktonic bacterium in a liquid environment like an ocean. This 
bacterium is unlikely to find another kin to interact due to high dispersal and 
diffusion, thus has to overcome the constraints of its environment by 
possessing all necessary traits. Therefore, it is not surprising that in what 
we define as wild type planktonic bacteria populations, each cell will 
generally have more cooperative traits, than the cells in more complex 
situations where the probability of exchanging goods is higher, such as in 
biofilms in infections of CF lungs where various subpopulations lose or 
maintain different traits, making each cell a partial cooperator in a division 
of labor scenario. When more humans live in close proximity to exchange 
goods and services, specifications to certain tasks and division of labor are 
generally observed. In fact, each individual will lose the ability to perform 
more traits, when more frequent interactions would be available with more 
individuals (Wood, 1991). This progression of trait loss and population 
growth can be observed starting from the hypothetical human on a 
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deserted island to a hunter-gatherer society to a farming society and 
eventually to an industrial society in the modern times where each 
individual performs only one task and depends on all the other tasks to the 
society while the overall society becomes more robust to external changes. 
Certain theories in economics, such as ‘comparative advantage’, which 
describes how two individuals, companies, or countries can save time and 
energy by specializing in the production of one trait while exchanging for 
the others, have already been the subject of interdisciplinary studies in 
microbiology (Enyeart et al., 2015; Tasoff et al., 2015). These analogies 
and interdisciplinary studies can help to understand the complex and dense 
biofilms in CF infections where bacteria lose certain traits during the course 
of the infection however the whole population becomes more robust to 
external changes, antibiotics, inter-species competition, and to the immune 
system elements.  
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Conclusion 
Collectively, the experimental and theoretical results presented in this 
thesis underline the main factors that govern the social behaviors, and the 
mechanisms, such as quorum sensing that can regulate them in favor of 
preserving cooperation. Furthermore, the novel tri-partite approach 
underlines the need for including polymorphism and multiple constraints in 
pertaining to cooperation in microbial populations. Our results demonstrate 
that using conditions that include more than one social trait can reveal 
complex and dynamic social roles in bacterial populations as well as their 
dependence on the environment. Understanding the dynamics of 
polymorphic populations in these complex environments provides insights 
into social interaction processes, expanding their relevance beyond 
sociomicrobiology, in addition to providing knowledge important for the 
development of new therapeutic tools. 
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Appendix 
Cumulative numbers of cell divisions as the timescale for 
cheating 
To further analyze what factors affect the relative fitness of lasR in 
iron-supplemented casein and iron-depleted casein media we focused on 
the data demonstrated in Chapter II. The first observation that is significant 
is the twice as much higher yields in iron-supplemented casein media 
compared to iron-depleted casein (Figure 14B and Figure 15). We argue 
that this difference affects the relative fitness in two ways. 
First, as it can be seen in Figure 17A and Figure 17C, the relative 
fitness of lasR in iron-depleted casein media is half of the one in iron-
supplemented casein media. Here, cells in both media start growing from 
the same initial numbers (107 CFUs/ml, OD600=0.05) but grow to different 
final yields (approximately 4x109 CFUs/ml or OD600=6 in iron-supplemented 
casein and 2x109 CFUs/ml or OD600=3 in iron-depleted casein media) which 
means that the cells go through different numbers of cell divisions since 
they experience a higher numbers of generations in iron-supplemented 
casein (log2(4x10
9/107)) than in iron-depleted casein media 
(log2(2x10
9/107)). This could be one of the effects on the final yields on the 
relative fitness (Figure 48). 
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Figure 48. Cumulative numbers of cell divisions and generations in 
populations with different carrying capacities but same inocula. 
Given that the cost is the same in both scenarios (A) and (B), the relative 
fitnesses of the mutants in these conditions should be proportional to the 
number of cell divisions that those populations experience: 
Relative fitness of A / Relative fitness of B  15/7 
Here, the difference between the carrying capacities is important because it 
changes the number of generations, thus the number of cell division events. 
Secondly, in Figure 20, we apply 1/1000 bottleneck to the cultures 
from the 2nd day and onwards. This causes the cultures to experience same 
numbers of generations in each media (log210
3). However the relative 
fitness of lasR in iron-supplemented casein media is again greater than in 
iron-depleted casein media (from day 2 to 4, mean ω=3,08 SD=0,71 N= 6 
and mean ω=1,33 SD=0,51 N=6, respectively). Thus, the tragedy of the 
commons is achieved much earlier (day 12 and day 18, respectively). The 
role of the different yields here is different than the one in Figure 17. Here, 
since we propagate cells from the stationary phase to inoculate a fresh 
culture by using a bottleneck (1/1000 for both media), the initial numbers of 
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cells would be proportional to the yields in the previous culture. For 
example, at the end of the 2nd day cultures grew to approximately 4x109 
CFUs/ml in iron-supplemented casein media and 2x109 CFUs/ml in iron-
depleted casein media. After the bottleneck, there are approximately 4x106 
CFUs/ml in iron-supplemented casein media and 2x106 CFUs/ml in iron-
depleted casein media. Given the cells will experience the same numbers 
of generations, they will go through different numbers of cell division events 
due to different initial cell numbers (Figure 49). 
 
Figure 49. Cumulative numbers of cell divisions and generations in 
populations with different carrying capacities and different inocula. 
Given that the cost is the same in both scenarios (A) and (B), the relative 
fitnesses of the mutants in these conditions should be proportional to the 
number of cell divisions that those populations experience: 
Relative fitness of A / Relative fitness of B  14/7= 2 
Here, the difference between the carrying capacities is important 
(considering that final population of one culture will be used to inoculate the 
next culture after a dilution), because it changes the number of initial cell 
numbers, thus the number of cell division events. 
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To conclude, we argue that the relative fitness advantage of lasR 
would be expressed in each cell division event and the numbers of cell 
divisions are not only proportional to the numbers of generations but also to 
the initial cell numbers (Lee et al., 2011). And this would be expressed as: 
Cumulative number of cell divisions = Final number of cells – initial number of cells  
CCD = Nfinal – Ninitial 
Whereas generation numbers (G) are expressed as: 
G = log2 (Nfinal / Ninitial) 
We can also express CCD as a function of NG as below: 
CCD = Ninitial (2
G – 1) 
In this thesis, we used relative fitness per cell division as the ultimate 
cheating magnitude unit (see Chapter II / Results / Section: “Effects of 
environmental constraints and population composition on cheating”, pages: 
52 - 53). This calculation is an approximation of the cost value that is spent 
in the production of the public good which gives the competitive advantage 
to the cheater as it avoids this cost. 
As can be seen in Chapter III, when we modelled PG competition 
simulations as continuous replicator functions, we used CCD as the 
arbitrary time unit on the x-axes of the simulation plots. 
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“Só de aceitar tenhamos a ciência, 
E, enquanto bate o sangue em nossas fontes, 
              Nem se engelha connosco 
              O mesmo amor, duremos, 
 
Como vidros, às luzes transparentes 
E deixando escorrer a chuva triste, 
              Só mornos ao sol quente, 
              E refletindo um pouco.” 
 
 Ricardo Reis, 17-VII-1914 
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